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The use of location-based services (LBS) (e.g., Intel’s Thing Finder) is expanding.
Besides the traditional centralized location-based services, distributed ones are also
emerging due to the development of Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs), a dynamic
network which allows vehicles to communicate with one another. Due to the nature of the
need of tracking users’ locations, LBS have raised increasing concerns on users’ location
privacy. Although many research has been carried out for users to submit their locations
anonymously, the collected anonymous location data may still be mapped to individuals
when the adversary has related background knowledge.
To improve location privacy, in this dissertation, the problem of anonymizing the
collected location datasets is addressed so that they can be published for public use without
violating any privacy concerns. Specifically, a privacy-preserving trajectory publishing
algorithm is proposed that preserves high data utility rate. Moreover, the scalability issue is
tackled in the case the location datasets grows gigantically due to continuous data collection
as well as increase of LBS users by developing a distributed version of our trajectory
publishing algorithm which leveraging the MapReduce technique.
As a consequence of users being anonymous, it becomes more challenging to
evaluate the trustworthiness of messages disseminated by anonymous users. Existing
research efforts are mainly focused on privacy-preserving authentication of users which
helps in tracing malicious vehicles only after the damage is done. However, it is still
not sufficient to prevent malicious behavior from happening in the case where attackers
do not care whether they are caught later on. Therefore, it would be more effective to
also evaluate the content of the message. In this dissertation, a novel information-oriented
trustworthiness evaluation is presented which enables each individual user to evaluate the
message content and make informed decisions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The use of location-based services (LBS) such as AT&T TeleNav GPS Navigator,
Sprint’s Family Locator, and Intel’s Thing Finder is expanding. Besides these traditional
centralized location-based services, distributed location-based services are also emerging
attributed to the development of Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) which allows
vehicles to communicate with one another and form a dynamic network. For example,
through VANETs, a vehicle may send inquiries to vehicles around certain landmarks to
obtain the up-to-date parking information, the condition of a road, or convenient lodging.
According to Cisco, global mobile data traffic has reached 1.5 exabytes a month and is
increasing rapidly. In 2013, 526 million mobile devices were added to cellular and wifi
networks [81]. Included in this increase in demand for more data is the use of location
based mobile applications. Currently, 74% of adults who own smartphones use their phone
to get directions and other information based on their current location. 30% of adults with
an account on social media sites say they have at least one of those accounts include their
current location in their posts [82]. Even if hand held devices are ignored, as many as 96%
of cars mass produced in 2013 are built with event recorders that include GPS [83]. This
does not include older cars with other GPS systems or vehicles with OnStar technology.
As a result, a huge amount of location information has been collected and stored for
analysis. More specifically, in centralized LBS, the central server collects users’ locations;
in distributed LBS like VANETs, there are Road-Side Units which collects users’ locations
for authentication purposes.
As more and more personal location data being collected, there have been
increasing concerns on users’ location privacy. Although many research has been carried
out to allow users to submit their locations anonymously, the collected anonymous location
data may still be mapped to individuals when the adversary has related background
2knowledge. For example, a trajectory with an anonymous ID but starting from one’s
home address can be easily associated with the home owner through public information
such as yellow page. In addition, as a consequence of users’ need to be anonymous
in LBS, it becomes extremely challenging to evaluate the trustworthiness of messages
disseminated by anonymous users. Existing research efforts are mainly focused on
privacy-preserving authentication of users. Such authentication would discourage most
users from misbehaving by tracing of the malicious users after the damage is done.
However, it is still not sufficient to prevent malicious behavior from happening in the case
of attackers that do not care whether they are caught later on.
Bearing the above challenges in mind, in this dissertation, three approaches are
proposed to achieve location privacy and trustworthiness management in centralized and
decentralized moving object environments. An overview of the approaches are presented
in the following subsections.
1.1. PRIVACY-PRESERVING LOCATION PUBLISHING UNDER
ROAD-NETWORK CONSTRAINTS
To improve location privacy, in this dissertation, the problem on how to anonymize
the collected location datasets is addressed first so that they can be published for public use
without violating any individual’s privacy concerns. It is worth noting that publishing of
location data can benefit people in many fields.
• Intelligent Transportation System [11]: If trajectories consistent with the road
network constraints are published, mining of the trajectory data enables offline
extraction of interesting patterns with associated temporal factor. These extractions
can help find out which routes are busy at which time of the day which further assists
in estimating potential points of traffic jams. With respect to the public sector, traffic
flow information can be extracted from published IDs and moving directions. Such
3information will play an important role in infrastructure construction and traffic light
control. It also helps answering specific query like how many vehicles entered a
certain region and also calculation of effective routes from one location to another at
certain time instant or in an emergency (e.g., for ambulances).
• Infrastructure Construction : The published trajectory data combined with the
knowledge of spatial databases can help determine which regions are most busy
and what times of the day. With respect to the business domain, traffic information
can help decide the location of company branches, and also advertisements can be
customized and disseminated at the most advantageous locations.
• Traveling [79]: Publishing trajectory data allows the mining of frequent patterns
as well as popular destinations. Such extractions can be of great help if you are
traveling in an unfamiliar region. Extraction of popular destinations can help you to
decide on places to visit and interesting patterns extraction can assist you in efficient
trip planning [71, 72]. Overall these extractions can help to make your traveling
experiences better.
However, in the meantime, location privacy concerns [37, 44, 62] may hinder the
development of the above attractive usage of traffic information. Therefore, a
privacy-preserving trajectory publishing algorithm is proposed that protects individual’s
privacy while preserving high data utility rate after anonymization. Unlike previous works
which typically ignore the constraints imposed by road-networks, the approach ensures that
the anonymized trajectories still follow the road networks and does not have any so-called
inference route problem (definition is presented in Section 3). Theoretical and experimental
studies have been conducted using both real and synthetic datasets to prove the efficiency
and effectiveness of the approach. Details of this work is presented in Section 3.
41.2. PRIVACY-PRESERVING LOCATION PUBLISHING IN BIG
TRAJECTORY DATASETS
The second challenge tackled in this dissertation is how to achieve privacy
preserving location publishing when the total number of trajectories is extremely large.
As mentioned earlier, LBS users generate 1.5 EB of data every month, and this number is
projected to grow to 15.9 EB per month in 2018 [81]. Last year’s global mobile internet
traffic, at 18 EB, was 18 times the size it was in 2000. This increase is attributed to over
a half a billion mobile devices being added to mobile networks last year. [81] Much of
that data has location and trajectory information that is stored for analysis. Currently, the
data limit for database type storage systems is in the order of exabytes [86]. While this is
impressive, the amount of information generated from several cities reporting trajectory
data will very quickly exceed this limit. In order to handle data of this magnitude,
companies rely on hundreds of thousands of computers working in parallel [87]. And
even with these resources, processing time can be often very slow due to the need to access
several machines at once and storing the data on multiple servers to allow fault tolerance
and recovery. With processing times slow enough already, anonymizing the data to protect
privacy will make it take even longer. None of the existing location publishing techniques
have considered how to deal with big trajectory datasets.
Therefore, a novel approach is proposed that is able to efficiently anonymize
a huge amount of trajectory data. Specifically, based on the previously proposed
privacy-preserving location publishing algorithm, a distributed version is proposed by
leveraging the MapReduce technique. In Section 4, the details of this approach will be
elaborated.
51.3. TRUSTWORTHINESS EVALUATION DURING LOCATION-BASED SER-
VICES
As a consequence of users being anonymous (attributed to efforts of privacy
preserving techniques), it introduces a new challenge in terms of evaluating the
trustworthiness of messages disseminated by anonymous users. Existing research efforts
are mainly focused on privacy-preserving authentication of users. Such authentication
would discourage most users from misbehaving by tracing of the malicious users after
the damage is done. However, it is still not sufficient to prevent malicious behavior from
happening in the case of attackers that do not care whether they are caught later on. For
example, terrorists may take advantage of Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) to send
fake message and create massive car accidents.
Therefore, it would be more effective to also evaluate the content of the message.
However, due to the dynamic nature of moving objects and the dynamically changing
topology of VANETs, existing solutions for information validation in alternative domains
such as P2P and social network environments [13,14,23,25,48,49,80], are not suitable. For
example, in social network sites, users typically gain reputation if they contribute correct
information. Based on one’s reputation (and possibly content analysis [14]), other users can
determine whether his information is trustworthy. However, reputation is established using
a stable network over a relatively long period of time (a day, a week or even longer), and
neither one of them exists in VANETs. In VANETs, even if an individual keeps a historical
database of vehicles that he traveled along with, the database may not be useful since he
may not come across the same vehicles again in the future. Moreover, compared to social
networks, the mobility of vehicles imposes strict time constraints on making informed
decisions. Notice that authentication protocols are also not sufficient, as they can only
certify message origin but cannot guarantee that the identity holder will send truthful and
accurate messages in VANETs.
6In this dissertation, a novel information-oriented trustworthiness evaluation
approach is presented which enables each individual user to evaluate the message content
and make informed decisions. In Section 5, the details of this work are presented.
1.4. DISSERTATION OUTLINE
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows:
• Section 2 reviews different anonymization techniques to preserve location
privacy, MapReduce technology and different works in adopting this technology
for processing big location data and different approaches used to evaluate
trustworthiness in VANETs.
• Section 3 defines a new privacy problem, Inference route problem and attempts
to solve it using the proposed clustering-based anonymization technique, an error
function to control entry of trajectory to various clusters and C-tree for efficient
clustering.
• Section 4 presents the adoption of MapReduce programming model to efficiently
anonymize big location data.
• Section 5 presents the proposed real-time trustworthiness evaluation scheme which
takes data similarity, data conflict and route similarity into consideration.
• Section 6 concludes the work and discusses directions for future work.
72. LITERATURE REVIEW
Since k-anonymity is very effective for privacy preservation, a brief background
information about k-anonymity is presented in this section. Then, existing works on
location privacy protection are discussed.
2.1. k-ANONYMITY
The growing demand for sharing information globally, aided by the availability
of huge data warehouses, has led to the release of specific data (microdata). Unlike
the release of statistical information of the data, release of microdata allows to perform
analysis as required. Both computational power and active research going on in data mining
are ever-increasing. This helps in effective analysis of the released data. The analysis
may reveal interesting patterns which can be deployed for decision making. Neither the
removal nor the encryption of explicit identifiers (e.g., social security numbers) is sufficient
in ensuring anonymity for privacy protection. Therefore, certain approaches need to be
adopted to preserve privacy. Of these approaches k-anonymization is one of the most
dominant.
In many cases, information needs to be anonymized before it is shared with other
people to ensure that privacy is preserved. To protect against linking attacks, k-anonymity
can be used. An example is given in Table 2.1. In this table, explicit identifiers, (i.e.,
social security number and name) were removed before the table was published to preserve
privacy. However, an attacker can still utilize specific information (such as the Voter’s list
as given in Table 2.2) to identify a particular person. The attacker does this by linking a
combination of attributes in Table 2.1 with similar attributes in Table 2.2 (e.g., date of birth,
sex, zip code and occupation). For example, the attacker can infer that Alice Smith has tax
8Table 2.1. De-identified table (tax-return)
SSN Name Date of Birth Sex ZIP Occupation Tax Return($)
82/10/12 M 65401 Professor 3000
83/01/11 F 65402 Software Analyst 4000
82/11/10 F 65400 Student 1000
83/12/25 F 65401 Computer Programmer 4000
83/12/20 F 65400 Marketing Manager 5000
Table 2.2. Public table (Voter’s list)
Name DOB Sex ZIP Occupation
.......... .......... .......... .......... ..........
Smith Alice 83/01/11 F 65402 Software Analyst
.......... .......... .......... ......... ..........
return of $ 2000, a breach of Alice’s privacy. These attributes, whose values are available
from external sources for linking are termed as quasi-identifiers.
The k-anonymization approach ensures that each released tuple is indistinguishable
from at least k other tuples [18]. The probability of identifying the tuple is, at most, 1/k.
Consider k = 2, the tuples in Table 2.1 can be anonymized as follows. The attribute “Date
of Birth” is generalized by publishing only the birth year. The attribute “ZIP” is generalized
by publishing the first four digits and the “Occupation” is generalized as related to either
academics or industry. The anonymization result is presented in Table 2.3 which satisfies
k-anonymity.
Two approaches are commonly employed to achieve k-anonymity: generalization
and suppression. Generalization [6, 24, 60, 66] technique is most often used to achieve
k-anonymity. Generalization involves substituting the attribute of published data with
9Table 2.3. k- anonymized table
SSN Name Date of Birth Sex ZIP Occupation Tax Return($)
82 unknown 6540* Academics 3000
83 F 6540* Industry 4000
82 unknown 6540* Academics 1000
83 F 6540* Industry 4000
83 F 6540* Industry 5000
more general values. Certain outlier tuples with support less than k may create a high
generalization. For example if Table 2.1 has a tuple {83, M, 68001, Married, Professor,
$3000 }, the generalization of attribute “Sex” is increased to unknown and “ZIP code” is
increased to 6**** in certain tuples within the table. Therefore this tuple can be considered
as an outlier and suppressed accordingly. The released data becomes less accurate as the
generalization increased. Generalization with suppression is proposed to increase data
utility. Suppressing [1, 5, 41] the outlier tuples helps to achieve k-anonymity within an
acceptable generalization. However, the data becomes more incomplete as suppression rate
increases. The maximum number of tuples to be suppressed is assumed to have been given
and k-Minimal Generalization with Suppression is defined such that this generalization
satisfies k-anonymity, the number of tuples suppressed is less than or equal to the given
value; and no other generalization exists with a higher information content [10, 38, 58, 69].
In traditional databases, tuples in a single table share the same set of
quasi-identifiers. However, in trajectory databases, the quasi-identifiers may vary for each
mobile object. An adversary may know the objects’s locations at different times. Therefore
k-Minimal Generalization with Suppression is not directly applicable to mobile object
databases. The k-anonymity approach remains the dominating approach for preserving
privacy due to its practical implications.
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2.2. LOCATION PRIVACY
When a mobile object wishes to use a location-based service, it needs to report its
location. These locations are collected ubiquitously by location-based service providers
such that queries of mobile objects over both mobile objects (for instance, ”find my friends
near me”) and static objects (for instance, ”find the nearest Japanese restaurant”) can be
accomplished. However, this reporting poses a risk of information misuse. Location
information could be linked to real people with the help of publicly available information
(e.g., the Yellow Pages). Historical trajectories can be revealed and private information
no longer remains private. This privacy violation necessitates some measures for privacy
protection before the location information is reported.
Existing works on location privacy protection generally fall into two categories:
(1) online location or trajectory anonymization (2) offline trajectory anonymization for
trajectory publishing, as shown in Figure 2.1. When a mobile device wants to use a
location-based service, it has to report its location along with the service request. The
online location or trajectory anonymization is implemented by anonymizing location and
trajectory while the mobile device is using the service to preserve privacy. The offline
anonymization of trajectories is performed to preserve location privacy while publishing
location data collected by various sources (e.g., a location-based service provider). The
approach presented here considers a scenario in which location privacy needs to be
preserved while publishing trajectory information for mining useful knowledge.
2.2.1. Online Location and Trajectory Anonymization. A great deal of
research has been conducted to better understand privacy issues in location-aware
mobile devices. Three types of techniques are commonly used to achieve online
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Figure 2.1. Location Privacy Division
Early works focused on maintaining policies on how a user’s location could be used
by the service providers [33, 59]. However it is difficult to define such policies clearly, to
enforce them and also to detect the violation of these policies. Therefore a more practical
approach (spatial temporal cloaking) was defined.
Spatial temporal cloaking has been widely used as an anonymization approach for
location privacy [17,26,29,30,32,36,45]. Gruteser et al. [32] first introduced the notion of
spatial temporal cloaking. As part of this approach, the user’s exact co-ordinate location is
cloaked into a region (either a rectangle or a circle) such that the user is k-anonymous in
that region. They proposed a variation to the spatial temporal cloaking by allowing users
to have different values of k according to their privacy requirements. For the cloaking
purpose, most approaches [26, 32, 45] used a third party anonymizer and the user reported
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its exact location to the anonymizer. Mokbel et al. [45] proposed a grid-based cloaking
algorithm using a third party anonymizer. This algorithm focused on the granularity metric
to obtain an optimal region with k-anonymity. Using a third party for cloaking require
the anonymizer to be trusted. An anonymizer can be vulnerable to attacks. It can also
be malicious. They only provide protection in a single snapshot and are unprotected
against correlation attacks. Recent approaches [17, 29, 30, 36] have focused on cloaking
in a peer to peer environment, eliminating the need for a centralized trusted anonymizer.
Chow et al. [17] proposed a client form a group of k users among its peers by multi-hop
communication and report the region covering the group. Ghinita et al. [30] tried to obtain
an optimal cloak region that would satisfy k-anonymity. They proposed hilbASR, an
approach that used a Hilbert space-filling curve to preserve locality and sort locations. This
ordering of locations which preserves proximity was stored in a distributed annotatedB+-
tree index and k users were grouped in this order. These approaches which perform
cloaking in a peer to peer environment however, still require that the exact location be
revealed to the trusted peers. Hu et al. [36] does not require the exact location of the user
to be exposed. It utilizes the proximity information gathered through either the received
signal’s strength or the time difference in the beacon signal’s arrival to identify the k
closest peers. A secure bounding protocol is then applied such that the cloaked region’s
size is reduced and the exact locations are not exposed. This approach is not suitable in
a dynamic environment. No mechanism can monitor the user’s locations.to keep track of
the locations of the users. The cloak region may not contain k users after a certain period
of time. In Gidofalvi et al. [31], segments of mobile objects’ trajectories are cloaked by a
rectangle. The rectangle’s size and location probability handle the user’s specific privacy
requirements. Anonymization is done on the client’s side eliminating the need for a trusted
middleware. However, the cloaking rectangle can be mapped to the actual trajectory if the
rectangle covers only one road in the real map.
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Ghinita et al. [28] deployed encryption based techniques that used a grid based
framework to preserve location privacy. In this technique, the user encrypts the cell at
which he is located and he retains the ability to retrieve correct information. This process
is based on Private Information Retrieval(PIR) and supports private nearest neighbor
queries. Unfortunately this technique requires the entire database to be encrypted and is
computationally expensive.
A comparative analysis of these three approaches is performed (see Table 2.4).
Comparisons are done with respect to the privacy protection model, query accuracy,
complexity and the use of a trusted agent. Policy-based approaches provide the least
privacy protection as nothing is implemented to preserve privacy, they are just policies.
Query accuracy depends on the accuracy of the location reported. Policy-based approaches
provide 100% accurate query results. They also maintain the lowest complexity because
they are simple policies and do not use third party anonymizers. Spatial-temporal cloaking
provides an in-between privacy protection among the three approaches. A cloaked location
is reported and the probability of identifying the location in the cloaked region fulfils
the privacy requirement. It provides lower query accuracy than either of the other two
approaches due to the reporting of the cloaked region. It has higher complexity than
policy based. A mobile object has to contact a third-party anonymizer to cloak its location
before using a location-based service. However, it has less complex than encryption-based
approach as encryption is not used. The encryption-based approaches provide the highest
privacy protection as the entire database and location is encrypted. They also provide
100% query accuracy. However, they have the highest complexity as encryption is
computationally expensive. They do not use any third-party anonymizers.
2.2.2. Offline Trajectory Anonymization for Data Publishing. Privacy
preserving location publishing is a relatively young area in which little research has
been conducted. Studies conducted on privacy-preserving location publishing considered
trajectories that were represented as sequences of coordinates; they utilized output
14






Complexity Use of Trusted
Agent
Policy-based Low High (100%) Low No
Spatial-temporal
cloaking
Medium Low Medium Yes
Encryption-based High (100%) High (100%) High No
anonymization results in the form of either cloaking regions or centers of clusters.
However, these approaches did not generate anonymized trajectories that followed the road
network constraints.These anonymization results preserved the user’s privacy but were not
beneficial to the traffic analysis of individual roads. The goal of this study was to achieve
both.
Nergiz et al. [51] represented each trajectory an ordered set of spatio-temporal 3D
volumes (e.g., points). Their approach adopted a condensation based grouping algorithm
for trajectory k-anonymity. Each cluster was then anonymized to ensure that the optimal
point matching minimized the log cost. Finally, reconstruction was deployed to output
atomic trajectories and ensure privacy. Monreale et al. [46] clustered trajectories and
then transformed them into into a sequence of Voronoi cell centroids. Such anonymized
trajectories are no longer real trajectories. They can be located even in the middle of two
parallel roads. Domingo-Ferrer et al. [20] used a distance function to cluster trajectories.
They replaced a location time triple in an anonymized trajectory with an existing triple
that was in close proximity to the original trajectory , thereby, satisfying k-anonymity.
Two triples, though close in proximity, may belong to two different roads. This will
make make it easier for the adversary to identify fake trajectories given the road map
is publicly available. Abul et al. [1] used a coarsening strategy to remove one or more
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spatial points in a trajectory to achieve anonymization. An anonymized trajectory may
contain disconnected paths. Similarly, Mohammed et al. [43] adopted a greedy algorithm to
suppress locations in the trajectories and achieve anonymity. However, using suppression
alone may decrease the utility of the anonymization results. Mohammed et al. [43] did
not provide any experimental results that would prove the effectiveness of their approach.
Abul et al. [3] considered a trajectory to be a cylindrical volume in which the radius
represents the location’s imprecision. They then perturbed and clustered the trajectories
with overlapping volumes to ensure that each released trajectory volume enclosed at least
k − 1 additional trajectories. Finally they used the sum of the euclidean distance between
location points at each trajectory’s time points to measure the clusters’ similarities. Rather
than grouping trajectories according to their similarities, Yarovoy et al. [73] grouped
according to so-called quasi-identifiers . Quasi-identifiers (QIDs) are identified as a set
of time stamps at which the the moving object’s location is assumed to be known. Each
moving object has its own set of quasi-identifiers. The primary objective of grouping
QIDs is to generalize the locations at the QIDs to a region. This grouping to achieve
k-anonymity is done such that the induced attacker graph is symmetric. A coordinate
location is converted into a one-dimensional proximity preserving, hilbert index. The top
k candidates available to form a group with a moving object are computed according to
their overall score. This score is defined as the sum of the absolute difference between the
hilbert indices of the moving objects’ locations at all time points. It proposes the following
two algorithms
• Extreme union where union of all QIDs of the moving objects (MOBs) in a group
is computed and then all the MOBs in the group are generalized at all QIDs in the
union.
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• Symmetric anonymization where the QIDs for generalization are fixed and then the
group is adjusted such that the induced attacker graph is symmetric. For instance if
MOB A is in group of B, then B should be included in group of A.
However, the selection of these quasi-identifiers is quite difficult in practice.
Pensa et al. [54] proposed a prefix-tree based anonymization algorithm. This
algorithm guarantees k-anonymity of the published trajectories in such a way that no
trajectories with support less than k will be published. Longest Common Subsequence
(LCS) is used as a distance metric to measure the similarity between two trajectories. Pensa
et al. [54] defined the support of a trajectory Trj as the number of trajectories containing
Trj. This definition however, causes the inference route problem. Here, the manner in
which the k anonymity is applied will affect the quality of the anonymization result.
Additional studies were conducted to examine trajectories that are represented by
either landmarks or locations of interests. Such trajectories, however, provide primarily
moving patterns. They do not provide real trajectories For example, Andrienko et al.
[8] examined the various behaviors of moving objects (e.g., positions of start and end,
significant turns, and significant stops) to cluster the trajectories. Monreale et al. [47]
proposed a generalization approach using semantics of the trajectories. They temporally
ordered sequence of important places visited by a moving object with the help of a places
taxonomy. However, even though a sensitive location (e.g, an Oncology clinic) may be
generalized to Clinic, there may be only one clinic at that location and hence an adversary
could still infer the sensitive information. Two related works used time confusion and path
confusion, respectively. The time confusion approach [35] mixes the location samples of
different trajectories, and the path confusion approach crosses paths in areas in which at
least two users meet. The primary issue with these two approaches is that traffic flows are
no longer preserved.
Several researchers assumed that attackers have a certain amount of knowledge
prior to their attack. Terrovitis and Mamoulis [63] assumed that the adversaries know
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the partial trajectory information of some individuals. For example, consider Octopus,
a company based in HongKong [63] keeps track of the customers who use an Octopus
card in day-to-day transactions. If the company publishes the customers’ trajectories, it
can contribute to mining movement and behavioral patterns of HongKong’s residents. If,
however, a customer uses the card to pay at convenient stores that belong to the same chain,
the convenient store can extract its transaction history and deduce a subset of the customer’s
total trajectory. If this partial trajectory uniquely identifies the customer in the trajectories
published by the Octopus company, then the customer’s privacy is violated. The location
points in the trajectories are suppressed to prevent the inference of new location points
with high certainty. Similarities between the original and anonymized trajectories are used
to measure the data’s utility. If a point is suppressed, the distance between the point and
its anonymized counterpart is equal to the maximum distance between any two points on
the map. Terrovitis and Mamoulis used the partial trajectories owned by the adversaries
as part of the input into their anonymization algorithm. Such usage limits not only the
generality but also the feasibility of their approach. Chen et. al. [16] proposed an algorithm
to publish differentially private trajectory data. This algorithm added noise to a prefix tree
under Laplace transform.
Some representative related works [3, 50, 54, 63, 73] have been summarized based
on their key ideas in Figure 2.2. The key ideas include the distance metric used to
measure similarity between two trajectories, consideration of road network constraints,
the complexity and the data’s utility. None of the approaches consider the road network
constraints. These approaches do, however, use a variety of distance metrics (e.g.,
euclidean distance, the hilbert index, the log cost metric and LCS). Data utility is measured
on the basis of how much the results of a common data mining technique (e.g., clustering
and range query) differ when both the original and the anonymized data sets are used. A
worst case complexity analysis of these approaches is listed in Fig. 2.2. Here, n is the total
number of trajectories. The complexity of the greedy clustering [3] is O(nM) where M is
18
the number of seeds used in clustering. This value is much smaller than n. Range query
distortion is used to measure data utility. The same range query is applied to the original



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.2. Offline Location Privacy Preserving Approaches Analysis
19
Terrovitis and Mamoulis [63] used the similarity between the original and the
anonymized trajectories to measure the data utility. For each trajectory, the algorithm
iterates through each adversary’s private databases making the complexity, O(nA), where
A is the total adversaries.
The complexity of prefix tree anonymization [54] is O(n2). The data utility was
measured by comparing the frequent patterns in the original dataset to the frequent patterns
in the anonymized dataset. Pensa et al. [54] found that the frequent patterns decreased in
the anonymized dataset.
The complexity of the approach proposed by Yarovoy [73] is O(mnkα(nk)).
The complexity is the summation of disjoint sets union/find data structure with path
compression’s complexity, O(nkα(nk)) and generalization’s complexity O(mn). Range
query distortion was used to measure data utility. Yarovoy [73] found that the symmetric
anonymization outperformed the extreme union.
The complexity of the approaches as discussed in [50] can be summed up
from distance computation’s complexity, O(n3) in hierarchical clustering and ERP
computation’s complexity, O(l2) using dynamic programming where l is the longest
trajectory. Clustering was used to measure the data utility. The original and anonymized set
of trajectories were grouped respectively using the same clustering approach. Good results
were reported up to a reasonable number of clusters (e.g., 20).
None of the aforementioned approaches consider the impact of road network
constraints. Hence, their anonymization results are vulnerable to attack when the malicious
party either knows the road map or holds other background information. For example, if a
cloaking region covers only one road, the corresponding trajectory can be easily mapped to
the road. To sum up, the privacy preserving location publishing approach proposed in this
dissertation is superior to existing works in terms of the following two major aspects.
• The anonymized trajectories follow road-network constraints and hence are more
effective for traffic analysis.
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• The anonymized trajectories prevent inference problems that have never been studied
by any others before.
2.3. LOCATION PRIVACY IN BIG LOCATION DATA
The handling of big data requires a scaling up of both storage and processing
power. Hadoop, an open source system which provides efficient storage and processing
(using HDFS and MapReduce respectively) was employed in this study. Works on big data
analysis using MapReduce are also reviewed.
2.3.1. Background in MapReduce. MapReduce is a functional programming
paradigm that enables the parallel programming of large data efficiently through multiple
nodes. Its programming model is built upon a distributed file system (DFS) that provides
distributed storage. Programmers specify two functions: Map and Reduce. The Map
function receives a key/value pair as input and generates intermediate key/value pairs to
be processed further. The Reduce function merges all of the intermediate key/value pairs
associated with the same (intermediate) key and then generates a final output. In a cloud
computing setting, these functions are orchestrated by the Master. They are carried out
by both mappers and reducers. The Master acts as the coordinator responsible for task
scheduling, job management and so forth.
A Master’s module (typically the data partitioner) splits the input data into a set of
M blocks. These blocks will be read by M mappers through DFS I/O. The execution of
map and reduce tasks is automatically distributed across all the nodes in the cluster. The
Map function takes as input one of theM blocks ( defined as a key-value pair) and produces
a set of intermediate key-value pairs. The intermediate result is sorted by the keys so that
all pairs with the same key will be grouped together (the shuffle phase). If the memory size
is limited, an external sort can be used to handle large amounts of data at one time. The
intermediate results’ locations are sent to the Master. The master then notifies the reducers
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so they can prepare to receive the intermediate results as their input. The reducers then use
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) to read the data received from the mappers. The user-defined
reduce function is then applied to the sorted data; the key pairs with the same key will be
reduced in some way, depending on the user-defined reduce function. Each mapper will
process the data by parsing the key/value pair. It will then generate the intermediate result
that is stored in the local file system. Finally, the output will be written to DFS.
2.3.2. Big Data and MapReduce. Few studies [67, 78, 91] have been focused
on big location data analysis using MapReduce. Wang et al. and Zhang et al. [67, 78]
represented a moving object as a point object with a location. Gedik and Liu [91] simplified
a customizable k-anonymity-based solution that hides a user’s identity. This method
works well for both small and large datasets. This method uses databases and a group
of computers to compare each piece of trajectory information with all other the rest of the
data. Hence, this method becomes very slow for huge amounts of data and ends up useless
in an environment that demands real time information.
Ene at al. and Zhenhua at al. [22, 40] focused applying popular clustering
algorithms, such as k-means and k-median on big data using MapReduce. However,
these algorithms are supervised and require multiple MapReduce jobs to accomplish which
increases latency. The approach discussed in the following subsections is unsupervised and
can be completed in a single MapReduce job, thus making it more efficient.
MapReduce research, thus far, has focused on providing a simple, yet powerful,
interface for handling large amounts of data. This research also focuses on providing
a dynamic way to handle divide and conquer techniques and optimizing parallelization.
The goals of MapReduce research are to achieve high performance on large clusters of
commodity PCs [92]. MapReduce technology, pioneered by Google R©, is an excellent tool
for clustering and simplifying data. However, it has never before been used to anonymize
trajectories. The focus of this study was on using MapReduce to anonymize big trajectory
data.
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2.4. TRUSTWORTHINESS EVALUATION IN VEHICULAR AD-HOC NET-
WORKS
Existing works on information trustworthiness in Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks
(VANETs) can be classified into three main categories [77]: (i) entity-oriented trust model
(ii) data-centric trust model and (iii) combined trust model.
The trustworthiness of information in an entity-oriented trust model is estimated
according to the message sender’s. For example, Raya et al. [55] utilized a static
infrastructure, such as a Certification Authority (CA), to evict malicious vehicles in
VANETs. They made the assumption that most of the users in an attacker’s neighborhood
are honest. Doing so allowed the vehicles to trust their honest neighbors in order to evict
attackers. Raya et al. [55] proposed two methods for misbehaving node revocation by
the CA. The first method is known as Revocation of the Trust Component (RTC). This
method deprives the misbehaving node of its cryptographic keys thus confirming that all
of its messages are disregarded by all other legal nodes. RTC is not robust against a
sophisticated adversary that controls the communication link between the CA and the TC.
The other method is known as Misbehavior Detection System (MDS) with Local Eviction
of Attackers by Voting Evaluators (LEAVE) protocol. The main principle of LEAVE is that
the neighbors of the misbehaving vehicle temporarily evict it. In Gerlach et al. and Minhas
et al. [27, 42] require a vehicle to build up a profile of each vehicle it comes in contact
with. This vehicle evaluates the trustworthiness of its peers based on its past interactions.
It then determines whether or not the information received is trustworthy. Despite their
capabilities, however, entity-oriented trust models have a number of limitations. For
example, VANET is a very dynamic environment and relationships among entities do not
last very long. This short-lived interactions cause difficulties to collect enough evidences
to trust an interacting entity. Additionally, even if an entity is trustworthy and honestly
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forwards a message it received, the receiver can not determine whether or not the message
itself is correct.
To address limitations in entity-oriented trust models, a number of researchers have
proposed that a message’s content be evaluated directly in addition to validating a message
sender’s identity. Raya et al. [56] used Bayesian inference and Dempster-Shafer theory to
evaluate the evidence received regarding an event’s occurrence. Their approach relies on
the availability of trust scores for the individual evidence (i.e., message) related to an event.
However, the calculation of trust scores is presented as a black box, which is considered
system dependent. The work discussed in this dissertation is distinguishable from the Raya
et al. [56] study in several aspects. First, specific functions were designed to compute
the trust score for each message rather than just a framework. Second, a more thorough
set of factors is explored including similarity among message routing paths, rather than
information received from directly interacting nodes [56].
The combined trust model [15, 21, 52] uses opinions gathered from various peer
vehicles to determine a message’s trustworthiness.This determination is used to suggest
a vehicle that has been identified as trustworthy by a number of trusted peer vehicles.
A vehicle’s honesty value increases as the number of trusted opinions increases (the
vehicle becomes more trusted). This process is an iterative process that is similar to
the true fact discovery problem in Internet [19, 74], an approach used to evaluate Data
Trustworthiness based on Data Provenance. However, this model has limitations similar to
the entity-oriented model. This model also assumes the peer vehicles have specific methods
they can use to evaluate the message content’s trustworthiness. The work discussed in
this dissertation actually develop a specific approach to evaluate a message’s content and
quantify the message’s trustworthiness based on this evaluation.
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3. PRIVACY-PRESERVING LOCATION PUBLISHING UNDER
ROAD-NETWORK CONSTRAINTS
The challenges on how to wisely use the location data without violating each
user’s privacy concerns are addressed in this section. This problem is termed as privacy
preserving historical location data publishing.
Historical location data forms a sequence of locations in chronological order,
termed as trajectory. In general, one’s trajectory consists of roads he has visited. For
instance, in Figure 3.1, user u1’s trajectory can be represented as IABC and user u4’s
trajectory is ABD. Many approaches [68] have been proposed to construct popular routes
from trajectory datasets. Publishing trajectories consistent with the road network will
enable the data mining algorithms to extract more precise routes patterns in comparison to
representing a trajectory as a sequence of symbols [8]. After taking into account the privacy














Figure 3.1. An Example of Inference-Route Problem
One may think that a trajectory resembles a conventional sequential pattern. Hence,
a naturally raised question is that if it is feasible to directly employ privacy preserving
data publishing approaches [7, 9, 53, 75] developed in non-spatial-temporal databases?
The answer is negative, and the main reason is that a trajectory distinguishes itself
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from the conventional sequential patterns due to additional constraints (e.g., road-network
information) which do not exist in the traditional sequences. More specifically, elements
in traditional sequences are usually independent of one another, while the relationship of
elements in the trajectory sequence is fixed under a particular road-network information.
Therefore, traditional algorithms can not be used to arbitrarily remove or replace elements
in the sequences because such operations will create unrealistic trajectories consisting of
non-connected road segments.
There have been several recent efforts [3,8,31,51,63] on anonymizing trajectories.
Some work [63] considers trajectories as a sequence of landmarks, e.g., stores and
museums, which ignore the paths connecting these places. Others [3, 8, 31] consider
trajectories as a sequence of coordinates in Euclidean space but do not fully consider
the road-network constraints. Specifically, their anonymization results mainly provide
movement trends (e.g., centroid of clusters of trajectories [46]). Since the centroid of
clusters could even be off road, e.g., a middle point of two parallel roads, it is hard to
tell the actual roads that a group of vehicles are traveling from the anonymized results.
Consequently, such anonymization results may not be as useful as real trajectories in terms
of providing good insight on traffic condition analysis for individual roads, and traffic lights
placement. Therefore, in this work, the anonymization output is also trajectories on real
road-network.
There are very few works that generate actual road-network-constrained trajectories
as the anonymization output. The most recent one is by Pensa et al. [54], who anonymize
trajectories based on k-anonymity [61]. The notion of k-anonymity guarantees that each
anonymized trajectory is a common trajectory of at least k users, and such anonymized
trajectories are called frequent trajectories. However, their approach may not preserve
trajectory information as much as possible. This can be demonstrated by the example
given below.
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In [54], trajectories are stored and anonymized by using a prefix tree which may
not be an appropriate structure to model the road-network. For instance, consider four
users who leave their homes (I , J , K, A) and head for work. Let k be 3, which means a
trajectory can be published if at least three users have this trajectory. Suppose that the input
to their algorithm is the following four trajectories: u1(IABC), u2(JABC), u3(KABC)
and u4(ABD)1, their anonymization result will be an empty set since the prefix tree treats
trajectories with different starting points independently. Such result obviously loses too
much useful information. To achieve better information utility, an alternative way is to
directly take partial trajectories as input, i.e., consider only busy roads with more than k
users. In this case, the input becomes u1(ABC), u2(ABC), u3(ABC) and u4(AB), and the
new anonymization result is: u′1(ABC), u′2(ABC), u′3(ABC) and u′4(AB), which is more
meaningful than the previous empty set.
In addition, since road maps can be found everywhere, in the domain
of privacy-preserving location publishing, it is reasonable to assume road-network
information is available to any adversary. Thus, cautions are very much needed when
publishing anonymized trajectories. For instance, let us continue from the previous
example and assume that the road-network in Figure 3.1 is accessible to an adversary Bob.
If Bob observes that Alice passes by road AB and BD at similar time every weekday,
then Bob can infer that u′4 is Alice who is the only one with trajectory entering BD in
this published dataset. Upon knowing the anonymous ID of Alice, Bob can track Alice’s
remaining trajectories in the published dataset. This inference-route problem is caused by
the fact that an adversary can infer someone’s unpublished trajectories from the published
location dataset. Because the inferred trajectories are infrequent (i.e., not many users have
such trajectories), with high probability, these trajectories, combined with certain external
knowledge, can be used to identify a particular individual’s trajectory information in the
published dataset. In general, given a threshold k, if the attacker can link any anonymous
1u1, u2, u3 and u4 can be thought as either a trajectory ID or a person’s symbolic ID.
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ID to Alice with probability greater than 1
k
by using the above method, then there is an
inference-route problem.
In this work, the problem of privacy-preserving location data publishing under
the assumption that road-network data are public information is addressed. This work
has three main properties: (1) it guarantees k-anonymity of published data, (2) it avoids
the inference-route problem, and (3) the anonymization results follow the road-network
constraints. The basic idea is to employ a clustering-based anonymization algorithm
to group similar trajectories and minimize the data distortion caused by anonymization
through a careful selection of representative trajectories. A C-Tree (Cluster-Tree) is
proposed to speed up the clustering process and develop methods to incrementally
calculating error rates.
3.1. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In general, raw data collected by location-based applications contains user (object)
information as a four-tuple 〈ID, loc, vel, t〉, where ID is the object ID, loc and vel
are object location and velocity at timestamp t respectively. The anonymized dataset
contains object information in the form of 〈aid, rid, dir, tint〉, where aid is an anonymized
object ID, rid is a road ID, dir is the object’s moving direction, and tint is a time
interval that includes the object actual traveling time t. Here, for privacy concerns,
specific locations and velocities are respectively replaced by road ID and moving direction;
trajectories are anonymized in the same time interval tint to preserve the time relationship
among trajectories. Such representation is sufficient to derive trajectories or traffic flow
information.
The road network is modeled as a directed graph, where each edge corresponds
to a road with objects moving at one direction, and each node represents an intersection.
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Specifically, an edge is represented as ninj , which means objects move from node ni to
node nj . Each directed edge is given a road ID ri.
The frequent road and inference-route problem are defined as follows.
Definition 1. Let W be a time interval, and let k be a threshold. A road is a frequent road
if the number of moving objects moving along one direction on this road is no less than k
within time W . The frequency of the road is the number of moving objects on that road.
In case the trajectory dataset covers a long time frame (e.g, days, weeks or months),
the time frame is divided into shorter intervals (e.g., hours) and trajectories falling into
the same time interval are anonymized. The motivation is that trajectories sharing roads
may not have enough impact on each other if they are far apart temporally. The unit of
division of time frame should be selected such that trajectories sharing roads may influence
each other on various conditions like increase in traffic or accidents. Two types of time
dimension partitioning are supported. One is to let users define a time frame which depends
on their time period of interest and the other is to divide the time frame uniformy. The unit
of division chosen is one to five hours.
Definition 2. Let Υ be an intersection of roads r1, ..., rm, and let U+i , U−i be the sets of
objects moving toward and outward Υ on road ri (1 ≤ i ≤ m) during W , respectively. If




i | ≥ k, |U
−
j | ≥ k, and (0< |U+i − U−j | < k or 0< |U−j − U+i | < k), then Υ
has an inference-route problem.
In the above definition, the constraints |U+i | ≥ k, |U−j | ≥ k ensure that only
frequent road segments are considered, and (0< |U+i − U−j | < k or 0< |U−j − U+i | < k)
check if there is an inference-route problem. To have a better understanding, let us revisit
the example in Figure 3.1. Node B is an intersection of three roads. On road AB, U+AB =
{u1,u2,u3, u4}; on road BC, U−BC={u1,u2,u3}. Since U+AB −U−BC = {u4}, |U+AB −U−BC | =
1< k, node B has an inference-route problem.
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The methods to evaluate the quality of the anonymized dataset of trajectories are
presented. Intuitively, the less difference between the anonymized dataset and the original
dataset, the better quality the anonymized dataset is. Therefore, two commonly accepted
metrics have been used: average error rate and standard deviation. Suppose there are N
roads (or edges in a road-network graph) and ri represents road i. Let originalri and
anonymizedri denote ri’s original frequency and frequency after the trajectories have been
anonymized. Then in Equation 3.1, the error functionE is defined as the average difference
between originalri and anonymizedri (i.e., Ei), and σ is the standard deviation of the
error rates. A low standard deviation indicates that the anonymization quality of each road



















(Ei − E)2 (3.2)
3.2. THE APPROACH
In this section, the anonymization algorithm of this work is presented. It consists
of two main steps. First, the time axis is partitioned into intervals, and records within
the same interval are grouped . In each obtained sub-dataset D, the records that are
associated with infrequent roads, i.e., roads with less than k objects within same time
interval are removed. The obtained dataset is denoted as D′. In D′, partial trajectories are
constructed for the remaining objects based on moving directions. Note that one user may
have several disconnected partial trajectories because he may visit some infrequent roads.
Each partial trajectory will be assigned an anonymous ID. For the rest of the dissertation,
words “trajectory” and “partial trajectory” are interchangeable.
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The second step is the core of the anonymization process. A clustering-based
anonymization algorithm is proposed which guarantees that by achieving strict
k-anonymity (defined in Section 3.2.1.) among partial trajectories, the anonymization
result is free of the inference-route problem. Compared to traditional k-anonymization
approaches, the approach not only needs to minimize errors caused by anonymization
but also needs to satisfy some unique requirements. Road-network constraints should
be enforced during the entire anonymization process, especially when computing the
representative trajectories. The first step is relatively straightforward. Therefore, the
following discussion focuses on the anonymization step.
3.2.1. An Overview of Clustering-based Anonymization. The essential idea
of clustering-based anonymization algorithm is to find clusters of similar trajectories and
anonymize them by using a representative trajectory. The details are the following.
First, a proper way to represent trajectories needs to be selected. Trajectories
are initially represented as a sequence of timestamped locations. In the anonymized
dataset, exact locations are not disclosed because detailed information increases attackers’
chances to link published location to specific individuals. Instead, information about which
object passing by which road is only reported. There are two options: (i) representing a
trajectory by road IDs; or (ii) representing a trajectory by node IDs. As illustrated in
Figure 3.2, trajectories Trj1, Trj2 and Trj3 can be represented as r4r2, r1r3, and r1r5
respectively following the first option. Using the second option, trajectories Trj1, Trj2
and Trj3 can be represented as n5n2n3, n1n2n4, and n1n2n6 respectively. Both types
of representations well capture the similarity between trajectories Trj2 and Trj3 which
share one common road. However, the first option treats Trj1 and Trj2 as two irrelevant
trajectories even though they intersect. To better reflect relationships among trajectories,
the second option is adopted and a trajectory is represented by a sequence of node IDs. The
second issue is to define the distance between trajectories. Since a trajectory can be seen as
a string of road-segment IDs, the edit distance [64] is employed to compute the amount of
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different road-segment IDs in the two trajectories. Specifically, the edit distance between
two trajectories is given by the minimum number of operations needed to transform one
trajectory into the other, where an operation is an insertion, deletion, or substitution of a
node. For example, the edit distance between Trj1(n5n2n3) and Trj2(n1n2n4) is 4, while
the distance between Trj2 and Trj3(n1n2n6) is 2.
The clustering-based anonymization algorithm is presented in this section.
An outline is given in Figure 3.3. First, same trajectories are grouped and the
trajectory’ssupport is counted. Support is defined as the number of users who have the
same trajectories (Definition 3).
Definition 3. Let u be a user’s anonymous ID and Trju denote his trajectory in D′. The
support of trajectory Trj is as follows: Support(Trj) = |{u|Trju = Trj, ∀ u}|.
Distinct trajectories are arranged in a descending order of their supports. If a
trajectory’s support is more than the anonymization threshold k, the trajectory itself forms
a cluster. For the remaining trajectories, say Trj, it is compared with existing clusters.
If there exists a suitable cluster, the new trajectory is inserted into that cluster and update














Figure 3.2. Trajectory Representation
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Clustering-based Anonymization (TRJ , k)
Input: TRJ is a set of trajectories to be k-anonymized
1. Group same trajectories and form TRJ ′
2. Sort trajectories in TRJ ′ in a descending order of supports
3. for each Trj in TRJ ′ do
4. if Trj.support ≥ k then
5. create a new cluster for Trj
6. else
7. check existing clusters
8. if Find Cluster(Trj,C) then
9. insert Trj to cluster C
10. Select Representative Trajectory(C ,Trjr)
11. update C’s error rate
12. update C − tree
13. else
14. create a new cluster for Trj
/* Clustering Adjustment Phase */
15. for each cluster C
16. if C.Total TRJ ≥ ρa then set C.Total TRJ = k
17. else remove C
/* Data Publishing */
18. Translate representative trajectories into output format
Figure 3.3. An Outline of Clustering-based Anonymization Algorithm
clustering, there is a clustering adjustment phase which deals with clusters containing less
than k trajectories. In particular, if a cluster contains less than ρa (ρa < k) trajectories, it is
directly removed. Otherwise, dummy trajectories are added to the cluster by increasing the
support of the representative trajectory to k. The selection of a proper ρa will be discussed
in Section 3.3. Finally, representative trajectories together with their supports are translated
into output format, which contains object anonymous IDs, road names, and objects’ moving
directions. For example, the following intermediate result is obtained after anonymizing
the trajectories shown in Figure 3.1: u′1(ABC), u′2(ABC), u′3(ABC) and u′4(ABC), where
k = 3. The published dataset will look like this: (u′1, R1, AB), (u′1, R2, BC), (u′2, R1, AB),
(u′2, R2, BC), ..., (u
′
4, R2, BC), where Ri is the name of a road.
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The algorithms for finding candidate clusters and selecting representative
trajectories along with definitions of local error rates and threshold will be elaborated in
the following subsections.
3.2.2. Finding Candidate Clusters. Figure 3.4 outlines the procedure to find a
candidate cluster for a new trajectory. The first step is to check whether a new trajectory
can be absorbed by an existing cluster. As the number of clusters increases, comparing Trj
with all clusters becomes very costly. Therefore, an in-memory index structure, the C-tree
(Cluster-tree) is employed to prune unnecessary comparisons. In particular, each node in
the C-tree contains multiple entries and each entry in a node has two fields: a pointer ptr
and a set of road IDs (denoted as RID). In leaf nodes, each entry has a pointer to a cluster
and the IDs of roads occurring in that cluster. In internal nodes, each entry has a pointer to
a child node and the union of roads IDs in its child node. It is worth noting that since roads
are modeled as directed edges, a trajectory can be represented as a set of road IDs without
confusion. For example, the trajectory r4r2 in Figure 3.2 can be represented as {r2, r4}
Find Cluster (Trj,C)
Input: Trj is a trajectory
Output: C is a cluster
1. NODE ← {C-tree.root}
2. while (NODE is not empty) do
3. for each node N in NODE do
4. for each entry en in N do
5. if Simc(Trj, en.RID) > ρt then
6. if N is not a leaf node then
7. add en’s child node to NODE
8. else add en’s cluster to candidate list Lc
9. for all clusters in Lc do
10. find clusters with smallest Ec regarding Trj
11. if Ec < ρc then
12. return the cluster found
Figure 3.4. Algorithm of Finding Clusters
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since there does not exist a trajectory r2r4 that is against the moving direction. The use of
road IDs for representing trajectories here facilitates easy comparison of supports on each
road as presented below. Such representation is only used for locating candidate clusters,
thus it does not affect the final selection of the most similar trajectory.
Figure 3.5 illustrates an example C-tree. Given a new trajectory Trj, starting from
the root of the C-tree, the similarity between Trj and RID is calculated in every entry of





Simc computes the percentage of common roads included in Trj and RID, where S(Trj)
denotes the set of road IDs in trajectory Trj. If Simc is above a threshold ρt, the child
node of this entry is visited. This process is repeated until all entries in the leaf nodes
with Simc above the threshold are found. All the clusters belonging to these entries will be
considered as candidate clusters. For example, suppose that a new trajectory contains roads
r2, r8 and r9, and the threshold ρt is 60%. The similarity Simc between the new trajectory
and the first and second entries in the root node N1 are 100% and 0% respectively. The
tree below the second entry is pruned and thus node N3 need not be visited. The child
node N2 pointed by the first entry is visited. The Simc between the trajectory and the first
and second entries in N2 are 33% and 67%, respectively. Since the second entry has the
similarity score above the threshold, its corresponding cluster C3 becomes the candidate
cluster for further consideration.
Among candidate clusters, the edit distance between their representative trajectories
and the new trajectory Trj is calculated. Based on the edit distance, a local error Ec
(defined in Section 3.2.4.) is then computed and the candidate cluster with the smallest Ec
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Figure 3.5. An Example C-tree
inserted into the corresponding candidate cluster. Otherwise, a new cluster will be created
for Trj.
When actually adding Trj to a cluster, both the representative trajectory and the
corresponding entries in the C-tree need to be updated. The algorithm for computing the
representative trajectory is presented in Section 3.2.3. After the representative trajectory
is determined, the node in the C-tree is checked if it needs to be updated with respect to
current cluster. If current cluster contains road IDs which are not included in the road ID
list of the corresponding C-tree entry, the new road IDs are appended to the road ID list.
This change will be propagated to higher levels of the C-tree until an entry containing all
road IDs in current cluster is reached. Consider the C-tree in Figure 3.5 and suppose that a
new trajectory that consists of roads r2, r8 and r9 will be inserted into cluster C3. A check
is done to the road list of C3’s entry in the C-tree, which is {r3r5r8r9} and does not contain
r2. r2 is then added to the road list. Now the second entry in N2 becomes {r2r3r5r8r9}.
Next, its parent entry, the first entry in N1 is checked. Since r2 is included in the first entry
in N1, the tree update operation completes.
In the other case when a new cluster is created for Trj, it requires to insert a new
entry for this new cluster to the C-tree. Recall that each entry in the node of the C-tree has
two fields: (i) a set of road IDs and (ii) a pointer. The maximum number of entries in each
node is the same. All insertions start at a leaf node which is identified during the process
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of finding candidate clusters. The new entry is inserted into that node (denoted as N) with
the following steps:
1. If the node N contains fewer than the maximum legal number of entries, then there
is room for the new entry. Insert the new entry in the node.
2. Otherwise N is full, and it is evenly split into two nodes. In particular, an entry
is randomly selected as seed. Then Simc (Equation3.3) is computed between other
entries and the seed. The average of all Simc serves as a separation value. Entries
with Simc above the average are put in the node N , and the remaining entries are put
in the new right node N ′.
3. Next, the entry pointing to N is updated. The road ID set in the parent is updated to
include all roads occur in N . The update may be propagated to the upper levels of
the tree. Moreover, if there is a split in the previous step, a new entry which includes
road IDs needs to be inserted in the new node N ′ to the parent level. This may cause
the tree to be split, and so on. If current node has no parent (i.e., the node is the root),
a new root will be created above this one.
3.2.3. Selecting Representative Trajectory. There are two key requirements
when selecting a representative trajectory. First, the global error rate E should be
minimized. Second, the representative trajectory must satisfy the road-network constraint.
By keeping these in mind, the following algorithm is designed.
In a cluster, the trajectory with the highest support is found and then trimmed from
both ends to obtain the final representative trajectory. It is illustrated using example in
Figure 3.6.
The cluster contains three types of trajectories: Trj1, Trj2 and Trj3. Each
trajectory is associated with a number of support, e.g., support(Trj1) = 10. Numbers on
the last line indicates the original numbers of users on each road, e.g., original(n1n2)=15.
Since Trj1 has the highest support, it is further looked at. The error rate E is computed by
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Trj1 (10): n1—– n2—– n4—– n7—– n8—– n9
Trj2 (5): n1—– n2—– n4—– n7
Trj3 (6): n2—– n4—– n7—– n8
original: 15 21 21 16 10
Figure 3.6. An Example of Selecting Representative Trajectory
treating Trj1 as the representative trajectory. The support of the representative trajectory is
the sum of the supports of all the trajectories in the cluster. The reason behind is to maintain
the same amount of trajectories after anonymization. In this example, if Trj1 is used as the
representative trajectory, the error rate will be E = 58%.















Observe that En8n9 is higher than 100%. If the road n8n9 is excluded from the
representative trajectory Trj1, the overall error can be reduced to 34%. Based on this
observation, the second step is to trim the roads in the trajectory that can help reduce the
overall error rate. Due to the road-network constraint, the nodes can not be arbitrarily
removed from a trajectory. The strategy is to remove nodes starting from both ends of the
selected trajectory. Also, too many nodes should not be removed, which otherwise leads
to poor pattern preservation. To reach the balance, only removing the nodes with error
rate above certain threshold is considered. In this case, the threshold is set to be 100% in
order to ensure that the overall error rate does not exceed 100%. Specifically, if a road r
which is located at the end of the trajectory and has an error rate larger than 100% (i.e.,
originalr < support(Trj1)−originalr), this road will be removed from the representative
trajectory. The process continues until such a road cannot be found at either end of the
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trajectory. The final representative trajectory for the example case is n1n2n4n7n8. The
algorithm is summarized in Figure 3.7.
3.2.4. Definitions of Local Error Ec. In the following discussion, C is used to
denote a cluster and Trjr to denote its representative trajectory. Let ri and anonymizecri
denote the road ri and ri’s frequency after anonymization within cluster C, respectively.
Note that here anonymizedcri is specific to a cluster and it is different from (just a
portion of) global anonymizedri . Formally, the relationship between anonymizedcri and






Select Representative Trajectory (C,Trjr)
Input: C is a cluster
Output: Trjr is the representative trajectory
1. support(Trjr)← 0
2. for each Trj in C do
3. if support(Trj) >support(Trjr) then
4. Trjr ← Trj
5. support(Trjr) ← support(Trj)
6. i← 1; j ← length(Trjr)-1
7. continue ← 1
8. while (i < j and continue) do
9. continue ← 0
10. if original(ri) <support(Trjr)-original(ri) then
11. i← i+ 1; continue← 1
12. if original(rj) <support(Trjr)-original(rj) then
13. j ← j − 1; continue← 1
14. Trjr ←(ri...rj)
15. return Trjr
Figure 3.7. Algorithm of Selecting Representative Trajectory
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Given a new trajectory Trj
new
, Ec is computed by assuming that Trj
new
has been
inserted into cluster C. The new cluster with Trj
new
is denoted as C ′ and is assumed that
the representative trajectory of C ′ is still the same as C but with an increased support by
support(Trj
new
). The definition of Ec is shown in Equation 3.5, where R is the set of
roads appearing in the new cluster C ′, and |R| denotes the total number of roads in R.
For each road ri in R, two values, transri and changeri are calculated. The value transri
is the difference of frequency of ri in C and C ′. The value changeri is the change of














For better understanding of Equation 3.5, the calculation is illustrated through
the following example. Consider the cluster C containing two types of trajectories:
Trj1(n1n2n4n7n8n9) and Trj2(n1n2n4n7), where support(Trj1)=10, support(Trj2)=5.
Suppose that the representative trajectory is Trjr(n1n2n4n7n8) and support(Trjr)=
15. Now Ec is computed upon the insertion of a new trajectory Trj3(n2n4n7n8) with
support(Trj3) = 6 into the cluster C. Table 3.1 summarizes the changes for each road
after the insertion of the new trajectory, where roads are listed in the first column of
the table, followed by its original anonymization value (anonymizedc), the anonymized
value in the new cluster (anonymizedc′), and corresponding values of trans and change.
Specifically, after the insertion, the anonymized values of the roads in Trjr will be
increased by support(Trj3) = 6 as shown in the second column in Table 3.1 and the last
column change denote the value of this change. The difference between road frequency in
cluster C and C ′ is shown in the third column of the table, from which it can be observed
that the insertion of the new trajectory does not change the overall frequency of roads n1n2
and n8n9 since the new trajectory does not contain the two roads.
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Accordingly, Ec can be computed as follows.
Ec = (Ecn1n2 + E
c
n2n4





(6− 0)2 + (6− 6)2 + (6− 6)2 + (6− 6)2 + (6− 6)2
5
= 7.2
Compared to the approach using merely E during clustering, Ec is more effective
since it captures the effect of error change after inserting a new trajectory. More specifically,
the value of E is dominated by originalri. If a cluster contains many roads which have a
large value of originalri, the insertion of even a dissimilar trajectory into the cluster will
result in a low E. In other words, global originalri does not truly reflect the situation in
a cluster. As more dissimilar trajectories are accumulated in the same cluster, the global
error E also increases. Unlike E, Ec is defined with respect to each individual cluster, and
hence conquers the aforementioned problem.
Ec has another advantage in that it can be quickly computed based on edit distance.
In this way, a great number of comparison can be avoided between original number of
objects and anonymized number of objects during error calculation. Specifically, Ec can
be expressed in terms of the edit distance between the representative trajectory Trjr and




ED(Trjr, T rjnew) · support(Trj)
2 (3.6)
Considering the same example discussed in this subsection, R contains five roads
and the edit distance between Trjr and Trj3 is 1. Therefore, Ec can be computed as




Table 3.1. An Example of Ec Calculation
Road anonymizedc anonymizedc′ trans change
n1n2 15 15+6=21 0 6
n2n4 15 15+6=21 6 6
n4n7 15 15+6=21 6 6
n7n8 15 15+6=21 6 6
n8n9 0 0 0 0
3.3. SELECTION OF THRESHOLD
The threshold selection is a critical task which affects clustering speed and
anonymization accuracy. This subsection discusses how to determine the threshold ρa for
the clustering adjustment phase and the threshold ρc for the clustering process.
After clustering all the trajectories, some clusters may contain less than k
trajectories. For these clusters, the threshold ρa is used to determine whether to remove
the clusters or add dummy trajectories to them. To minimize error after the adjustment, the





The basic idea of Equation 3.7 is that insertion or deletion of fewer trajectories induces
less error. Specifically, if the total number of trajectories in a cluster is less than or equal
to k/2, removing the cluster will introduce less error by adding more than k/2 dummy
trajectories. In the other case, if a cluster has more than k/2 trajectories, adding less than
k/2 trajectories will introduce less error than removing the entire cluster.
The threshold ρc determines whether a new trajectory can be inserted into an
existing cluster or not. If a low threshold is used, fewer trajectories will be inserted into a
cluster as only highly similar trajectories will be selected. This may result in having more
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clusters with less than k trajectories at the end of the clustering. Such clusters will either
be removed or include dummy trajectories, which in turn can increase the error rate. If a
high error threshold is chosen, even the trajectories which are less similar may be inserted
into the same cluster which also introduces more errors. To reach a balance, the threshold







This threshold is derived according to the clustering adjustment algorithm. As
aforementioned, if a cluster needs to be adjusted, the maximum number of trajectories
inserted into or deleted from the cluster is equal to k/2. The value of ρc is equivalent to
the error Ec induced when k/2 trajectories are inserted into or deleted from the cluster
computed using Equation 3.5. Given a new trajectory, if the corresponding Ec exceeds
ρc, this trajectory will not be inserted into the cluster being considered. Therefore, even
if the cluster needs to be removed during the adjustment phase, it will not introduce an
error more than ρc. Moreover, it can be observed that the value of ρc depends on the value
of k. That is, a larger k yields a higher threshold ρc. This is beneficial for the clustering
due to the following reason. A larger k may increases the risk of letting more clusters go
to the adjustment phase and hence may increase the global error. A higher threshold will
counteract this effect as it will group more trajectories into a cluster and reduce the number
of clusters with trajectories less than k.
3.3.1. Strict k-anonymity. In this section, the notion of strict k-anonymity is
defined. It is called “strict” because the calculation of trajectory supports is based on an
exact match of entire trajectories.
Definition 4. (Strict k-anonymity over trajectories): Let Trj be a trajectory. Trj satisfies
strict k-anonymity if Support(Trj) is no less than k.
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The anonymization results guarantees strict k-anonymity over all trajectories in
dataset D′. In this way, it is ensured that the anonymization result will not contain any
inference-route which is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Trajectories that satisfy strict k-anonymity do not contain any inference-route.
Proof. It is proved by contradiction. It is assumed that the anonymization result contains
at least one intersection (denoted as Υ) of roads r1, ..., rm, which has the inference-route
problem. Then by definition 2, among roads r1, ..., rm, there exist at least two roads ri and
rj such that |U+i | ≥ k, |U−j | ≥ k, but (0< |U+i − U−j | < k or 0< |U−j − U+i | < k) (where
U+i and U−i denote the sets of objects moving towards and outwards Υ, respectively).
If 0< |U+i − U−j | < k, that means less than k objects enter Υ from roads other
than ri. It implies that the trajectories of objects in (U+i − U−j ) have support less than k.
Similarly, if 0< |U−j − U+i | < k, that means less than k objects leave Υ and enter roads
other than rj . It implies that the trajectories of objects in (U−j −U+i ) have support less than
k. Both cases contradict with the property of the anonymization result which only contain
trajectories with support no less than k. Therefore, it is concluded that the approach does
not have any inference-route problem.
3.3.2. Complexity Analysis. In this section, the time and space complexity of
the approach are analyzed. In what follows, n is used to denote the total number of original
trajectories, and l is used to denote the maximum number of roads in a trajectory in the raw
dataset D.
First, the time complexity is analyzed. The approach consists of two main phases:
(1) removal of infrequent roads; and (2) the clustering-based anonymization. To remove
infrequent roads from the raw dataset, the road segments contained in all the trajectories
need to be scanned just once. The total number of such road segments is n × l. Given l
being a small and constant number, the complexity of the first step is O(n).
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For the clustering-based anonymization, the major cost is the search of the C-tree.
Let f denote the average number of entries in a node of the C-tree, and let kc denote the
average number of trajectories per cluster. The height of the C-tree can be estimated as
logf(n/kc). For each identified candidate cluster, a search is done from the root down the
leaf nodes in the C-tree. The total number of entries to be checked can be estimated by
the height of the tree multiplied by the number of entries per node, i.e., logf(n/kc) × f .
If multiple candidate clusters are identified, the cost is only increased by a small constant
number of additional entries being checked. Therefore, the time complexity of finding
candidate clusters is still O(log(n)). The remaining step is to check each trajectory in the
candidate clusters to select a representative trajectory, the cost of which is about kc × l.
Since kc is proportional to n and l is a small constant number, the time complexity of
selecting representative trajectory is O(n). Summing up the time complexity of the two
steps, obtained is the total time complexity of the clustering-based anonymization, which
is O(log(n)) +O(n).
Finally, the total time complexity of the approach is the sum of the two phases:
O(n)+ (O(log(n)) + O(n)), which is O(n). This indicates that the time complexity of
the approach is linear to the total number of trajectories, which is also confirmed by the
following experimental results.
As for the space complexity, the approach stores all the trajectories and the C-tree.
The total number of road segments in the trajectories are n × l. The total number of




, where h is the height of the tree and equals to logf (n/kc) as
previously discussed. Recall that f is the average entries per node and is a constant number.




, which is O(n) +O(f log(n)).
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3.4. EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
In this experimental study, the two approaches: Clustering-Based Anonymization
(CBA) [39] and Improved Clustering-Based Anonymization (ICBA) are compared. CBA
used E (Equation 3.1) during the clustering while ICBA used the new metric Ec (Equation
3.5). Then, the effect of the C-tree adopted by ICBA is studied. After that, ICBA is
compared with the latest related work (denoted as Prefix [54]) by testing the original source
code provided by the authors of [54]. Both synthetic and map-based datasets are used and
a variety of parameters including the data size, data distribution, average trajectory length
and value of k are varied.
In the synthetic datasets, objects are moving on a randomly generated road map
which has about 700 roads. The roads are generated by randomly selecting points (which
serve as intersections) in the space and then connecting nearby points to create the roads.
The average degree of an intersection is 4. Objects can have different speeds which are
controlled by the parameter “average trajectory length”. As for the map-based datasets, the
generator by Brinkhoff [12] is used. Objects are moving on real road networks. A road
consists of multiple segments and each segment is a straight line. An object is initially
placed on a randomly selected road segment and then moves along this segment in a
randomly selected direction. When the object reaches the end of the segment, an update is
issued and a connected segment is selected. Object speeds are varied within a given speed
range which controls the “average trajectory length”. Unless noted otherwise the data set
containing 50,000 moving objects is used as the default setting. The parameters used in the
experiments are summarized in Table 3.2, where values in bold denote the default values.
The performance is evaluated based on five criteria: (i) anonymization time; (ii)
average error rate as given by Equation 3.1; (iii) standard deviation as given by Equation
3.2; (iv) number of inference-routes in the anonymization result; (v) number of frequent
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Number of moving objects 5K, 25K, 50K, 75K, 100K




Number of moving objects 5K, 25K, 50K, 75K, 100K
Average trajectory length (km) 3.8, 5.0, 5.8, 6.4, 9.2
Number of roads (Map) 209(St Charles), 434(St Clair),
550(Phelps), 874(Jefferson),
1689(St Louis)
patterns after anonymization. All the experiments were run on a PC with 2.6G Pentium IV
CPU and 3GB RAM.
3.4.1. Anatomy of Our Approaches. The CBA and ICBA approaches are
compared and the results are reported in this section. The effect of the C-tree is also
observed.
3.4.1.1 CBA vs. ICBA. The first round of experiments compares the
performance of the two approaches: CBA and ICBA, by using synthetic datasets.
Figure 3.8(a) shows the average error rate of the anonymization results obtained from
CBA and ICBA when varying the number of moving objects from 5K to 100K. Observe
that the error rate of ICBA is lower than that of CBA for all cases. This is because
CBA adopts a fixed threshold which is set to an experienced value (60%) for all cases,
while ICBA benefits from the optimal threshold selection (Equation 3.8) as well as the
newly defined metric Ec (Equation 3.5). Figure 3.8(b) reports the standard deviation
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(a) Error rate (b) Standard deviation (c) Processing time
Figure 3.8. CBA vs. ICBA
where it can be seen that ICBA performs similarly to CBA. Figure 3.8(c) compares the
processing time. As shown, ICBA is much faster than CBA. This is because that ICBA
uses Ec to measure the intermediate error and Ec can also be expressed in terms of the
edit distance which has already been calculated in other steps during the anonymization. In
other words, ICBA requires less computation than CBA and hence ICBA is more efficient.
In summary, the above observations prove that ICBA improves CBA. Therefore, in the
remaining experiments, only ICBA will be considered.
3.4.1.2 Effect of the C-tree. In this set of experiments, the effect of the C-tree
is studied by comparing two versions of the ICBA approach: one with the C-tree and one
without using the C-tree (denoted as “ICBA no C-tree”). Figure 3.9(a) and (b) report the
average error rate and standard deviation with respect to the two versions, and Figure 3.9(c)
compares their processing time. It can be observed that the use of C-tree does not affect
the accuracy of the anonymization result, but significantly reduces processing time (more
(a) Error rate (b) Standard deviation (c) Processing time
Figure 3.9. Effect of the C-tree
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than an order of magnitude for 100K datasets), which demonstrates the effectiveness of
the C-tree. More specifically, when the C-tree is not used, a new trajectory needs to be
compared against all existing clusters, which is time consuming. When the C-tree is used,
the new trajectory just needs to be compared with a fewer number of candidate clusters.
3.4.1.3 Measuring the probability of re-identification. The probability of
re-identification of a user is also analyzed in the anonymized dataset. Note that, all the
users in the same anonymization cluster will be represented by the same representative
trajectory, and hence they are indistinguishable from one another regardless the amount of
prior knowledge that an attacker may have. Thus, the re-identification rate of each user in
the same cluster is the same and computed as 1
kc
, where kc is the number of trajectories
in the cluster. As discussed in Section 3.3.1., the approach guarantees k-anonymity which
means the re-identification probability will not be higher than 1
k
. In the actual experiments,
a much lower re-identification rate is observed as reported in Figure 3.10. In particular,
the maximum, the average and minimum probability of re-identification rate of all the




theoretical bound when the dataset is 100K. This is because the number of trajectories in
each anonymization cluster is usually more than k, and hence it provides better privacy
protection than the theoretical guarantee.
(a) Varying Dataset Size (b) Varying Parameter k
Figure 3.10. Probability of Re-identification
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3.4.2. Experimental Results in Synthetic Datasets. The experiments are
conducted using synthetic datasets and results are reported in this section.
3.4.2.1 Effect of data sizes. The performance of ICBA is now compared with
Prefix approach by varying the number of moving objects (i.e. number of trajectories)
from 5K to 100K. Figure 3.11(a) shows the average error rate of the anonymization results
obtained from ICBA and Prefix. It can be observed that ICBA yields much less error than
Prefix in all cases. When the dataset is small (e.g., 5K), the anonymization results obtained
from both algorithms have relatively high error rates. This is because the number of objects
on each road is few and even a small change of an object trajectory by the anonymization
process will have a big impact on the error rate. With the increase of the data sizes, the error
rate caused by ICBA keeps decreasing and it is more than 5 times less compared to that
of Prefix for 100K dataset. The reason of such behavior is that ICBA effectively groups
similar trajectories and carefully selects representative trajectories, which minimizes the
overall error rate. Also measured is the standard deviation of the anonymization results
obtained from two approaches . As shown in Figure 3.11(b), the anonymization result
generated by ICBA has much lower standard deviation than that by Prefix, which indicates
that the anonymization result on each road has similarly good quality.
Figure 3.11(c) shows the number of nodes (i.e., road intersection) having the
inference-route problem. It is not surprising to see that the anonymization result produced
by the ICBA algorithm contains 0 inference-route. However, the anonymization result
obtained from Prefix contains a large number of nodes with the inference problems and the
problem becomes more and more severe with the increase of the data sizes, which is caused
by their definition of trajectory support.
The processing time of both approaches is compared. As shown in Figure 3.11(d),
ICBA is up to 5 times faster than Prefix. This can be attributed to the C-tree that helps
prune the clusters to be compared with each new trajectory and hence avoids unnecessary
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(a) Error rate (b) Standard deviation
(c) inference-route problem (d) Processing time
Figure 3.11. Effect of Data Size
calculation. The total time is inclusive of the construction and update cost of the C-tree
which is almost negligible compared to the benefits brought by the C-tree.
3.4.2.2 Preservation of frequent patterns. The quality of anonymization
results is evaluated by comparing the anonymized trajectories obtained from ICBA and
Prefix with the frequent patterns discovered from original datasets using the traditional
data mining tool (i.e., PADS software [76]) as reported in Figure 3.12. When using PADS,
each transaction is corresponding to an original trajectory. Each item is corresponding to a
road ID in the trajectory. The anonymization parameter k is used as the minimum support
threshold in PADS. The mining results contain sets of sub-trajectories, each of which is
represented as sets of road IDs.
In general, the more frequent patterns are preserved, the better anonymization result
is. To measure this, the widely adopted F-measure is used as defined below, where Pr
and Pa denote the sets of trajectories in the data mining results and anonymization results
respectively,Nm denotes the number of trajectories in the anonymization results that match
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those in the data mining results, and Nr and Na denote the total number of trajectories in
the data mining results and anonymization results respectively.










Figure 3.12(a) reports the F-measure values of the Prefix approach and the ICBA
approach. Observe that the ICBA approach yields much higher F-measure values than the
Prefix approach in all cases, which indicates that ICBA preserves more frequent patterns.
This is because the Prefix algorithm directly removes infrequent trajectories which do
not share the prefix of a frequent trajectory, while ICBA attempts to preserve the best
possible patterns of the infrequent trajectories within the error threshold. Since trajectory
(a) Exact Match (b) Partial Match
Figure 3.12. F-measure
anonymization always needs to distort trajectories in the output, it is unrealistic to expect to
receive a perfect F-measure value which means all anonymized trajectories fully match the
original frequent trajectories. Therefore, how many trajectories that partially match the data
mining results is also evaluated. For this, the anonymized trajectories that have at least 50%
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road segments matching a frequent pattern in the original data mining results are recorded,
and added to Nm for computing the F-measure. Figure 3.12(b) shows the results. From this
figure, it can be seen that the F-measure values have been almost doubled compared to that
in Figure 3.12(a). This indicates that the anonymization results preserve partial frequent
pattern information very well.
3.4.2.3 Effect of parameter k. This set of experiments aims to evaluate the
performance of both algorithms regarding different values of k. As shown in Figure 3.13(a),
the error rate increases drastically with k by using the Prefix algorithm, while k has
only minor effect on the ICBA approach. Such behavior can be explained as follows.
Prefix removes all infrequent trajectories and adds their supports to most similar frequent
trajectories. When k is large, there are more infrequent trajectories, which thus causes
more errors. The standard deviation (Figure 3.13(b)) also demonstrats the similar pattern
as the error rate. Moreover, Prefix again suffers from the inference-route problem as can
be observed from Figure 3.13(c). Regarding processing time (in Figure 3.13(d)), ICBA has
(a) Error rate (b) Standard deviation
(c) inference-route problem (d) Processing time
Figure 3.13. Varying Parameter k
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a consistent performance and is much faster than Prefix when k is small. When k grows
bigger, the processing time of Prefix decreases. This is because Prefix needs to handle less
number of frequent trajectories for a larger k, which in turn results in higher error rates.
3.4.2.4 Effect of the average trajectory length. The effect of the average
length of the trajectory in terms of number of roads is now evaluated. The length is
determined by two factors: the length of time interval being considered and object moving
speed. As shown in Figure 3.14(a) and (b), Prefix incurs much higher error rate and
standard deviation than ICBA does for various lengths of trajectories. This behavior can
be attributed to the fact that longer trajectories increase the possibility of getting more
trajectory pattern with support less than k. Using the Prefix algorithm, the support of
a trajectory pattern will be added only to the common prefix between the trajectories.
Therefore, if the starting node of trajectories differ, the support will not be added even
though these trajectories may share the suffix or an infix. On the other hand, ICBA attempts
to capture similarity between trajectories either as prefix or suffix or an infix. This leads to


































































































































Figure 3.14. Varying Average Length of the Trajectory
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As for the inference-route problem (Figure 3.14(c)), the total number problematic
nodes generated by Prefix decreases as the trajectory length becomes longer. This is
possibly because that the increase of trajectory length results in less frequent trajectories
and reduces the chance of having inference-route problems.
As shown in Figure 3.14(d), there is a drastic increase in anonymization time with
the increase of average length of the trajectory when using the Prefix algorithm. The reason
is that longer trajectory increases the depth of the prefix tree, and hence more time is needed
for the anonymization process.
3.4.3. Experimental Results in Map-based Datasets. Ihe performance of
ICBA and Prefix is evaluated by using datasets generated based on real road maps using
the generator in [12]. The same four aspects are examined: variation of data sizes, frequent
patterns, value of k and average trajectory length, as that in synthetic datasets. In addition,
the effect of data distribution is also studied by using different road maps.
3.4.3.1 Effect of data sizes. In this set of experiments, the datasets are
generated based on the road map of Phelps County (Missouri, USA) which contains about
550 roads. As shown in Figure 3.15 and Figure 3.16, ICBA consistently outperforms Prefix































Number of moving objects
(b) Standard deviation
Figure 3.15. Effect of Data Sizes (Real Road-network)
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The reason is similar to that explained when evaluating synthetic datasets. In
addition, both approaches have high error rates when the number of objects (i.e.,
trajectories) is small and the error rates go down with the increase of objects. This is
because in the same road map, fewer objects result in fewer frequent trajectories, and hence
the impact of trajectory modification during anonymization is more severe.
(a) inference-route problem (b) Processing time
Figure 3.16. Effect of Data Sizes (Real Road-network)
3.4.3.2 Effect of parameter k. Figure 3.17 shows the performance of ICBA
and Prefix when varying k from 10 to 50. From the figure, following observations can
be made. First, both approaches yield more errors when k increases. The possible reason
is that larger k results in less frequent trajectories, and hence any change to trajectories
for the anonymization purpose has bigger impact on the final result. Second, it is also
interesting to see that Prefix has lower standard deviation, less inference channels and
even faster processing speed with a larger k. This is because that Prefix removes more
infrequent trajectories for larger k, which means Prefix needs to handle much fewer number
of frequent trajectories. Consequently, the standard deviation regarding each frequent
trajectory pattern is lowered, the total number of nodes with inference-route problems is
reduced and processing time is shorten.
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(a) Error rate (b) Standard deviation
(c) inference-route problem (d) Processing time
Figure 3.17. Effect of Parameter k (Real Road-network)
3.4.3.3 Effect of average trajectory length. This set of experiments evaluates
the effect of average trajectory length. As shown in Figures 3.18 and 3.19, ICBA again
outperforms Prefix in general. It is also observed that the error rate increases for both
approaches when the length of trajectory becomes longer.
The reason is similar to that for the case with a larger k in the previous experiments.
That is that the reduced number of frequent trajectory patterns with the growth of trajectory
































































Figure 3.18. Effect of Average Length of Trajectory (Real Road-network)
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process. Moreover, with the increase of trajectory length, Prefix suffers more from the
inference-route problem. The possible reason is that in the real road-network, the number
of roads connected by an intersection is usually small (e.g., two to four). This increases
the chance of having nodes with inference-route problems especially in long trajectories. In
addition, the trend of the processing time of two approaches resembles the case in synthetic

































































Figure 3.19. Effect of Average Length of Trajectory (Real Road-network)
3.4.3.4 Effect of data distribution. At the end, the effect of the data distribution
is studied by using various road maps. The total number of objects (or trajectories) is
the same, 50K, in all cases. The result is shown in Figure 3.20. Given different maps,
the ratio of frequent to infrequent trajectories is different. This explains the different
behavior of error rates for each map. In general, when there are more roads, the number
of frequent trajectories becomes less, which may increase the error rate in the anonymized
datasets obtained from both approaches. As for the inference-route problem, the more
complex the map is (e.g., St. Louis), the higher chance that Prefix generates more
inference-route problems in its anonymization result. Moreover, it also takes more time for
Prefix to handle larger and complex maps, while ICBA has relatively stable and much faster
processing speed. In a summary, the result demonstrates that ICBA has better topography

















































































(c) inference-route problem (d) Processing time
Figure 3.20. Effect of Data Distribution
3.5. SUMMARY
Privacy preserving location data publishing has received increasing interest
nowadays. In this section, this newly emerging problem is addressed by taking into
account an important factor, the road network constraint, which has been overlooked
by many existing works. A new privacy problem (i.e. the inference-route problem)
was identified and defined. An efficient and effective clustering-based anonymization
algorithm was proposed. It was proved that the clustering-based algorithm guarantees strict
k-anonymity of the published dataset and avoids the inference-route problem. To minimize
the global error rate after anonymization, the following major aspects were taken into
account: calculation of representative trajectories, definition and employment of local error
rates, and selection of threshold used at different stages of anonymization. An extensive
experimental study was conducted on both synthetic datasets and real datasets. The results
demonstrated the superiority of the approach compared to other works.
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4. PRIVACY-PRESERVING LOCATION PUBLISHING IN BIG TRAJECTORY
DATASETS
As aforementioned, the number of LBS users is increasing fast and the amount of
location data collected by the LBS service providers is also growing rapidly. In this section,
the scalability issue is tackled in publishing location data with privacy preservation.
4.1. THE APPROACH
The privacy-preserving location publishing technique (in Section 3) is extended to
a distributed version by leveraging MapReduce technology. For easy understanding, the
key ideas are illustrated using a simple example as follows.
Suppose that a map and trajectory data from St. Louis, MO are used. For simplicity,
the map is divided into four areas, NW, SW, SE, NE denoted as A1, A2, A3, A4 respectively.
Let k = 2 and the trajectories in the data set be u1, u2, ...., u9. These trajectories come from
a database controlled data center to the Master machine for the Map Reduce environment.
Suppose these three trajectories were included in part of the data:
T1 = {u1, u3, u4, u7}
T2 = {u1, u3, u7}
T3 = {u2, u5, u6, u8}
The trajectories would be sent to one or more mappers, with these trajectories included,
and the mappers would output key,value pairs that map each trajectory to an area.
(A1, T1), (A1, T2), (A2, T3)
This output is given to one or more reducers which will cluster trajectories
according to area.
(A1, T1 T2), (A2,T3)
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Additionally, the clusters are now anonymized at the reducer at the same time. For
A2, it can be seen that there is only one trajectory in the cluster. The threshold to guarantee
k-anonymity is 2. The algorithm will attempt to add the trajectory to another cluster, and
if it cannot find one, then it will be removed from the published data. In area one, the
threshold for the number of trajectories are met. However, if it is left as it is, then there will
be an inference problem. While both trajectories are very similar, A1 includes u4 while A2
does not. Again, the algorithm would try to find a better match for one or both trajectories.
However, if they are this similar, then u4 is removed from T1 for publishing and now there
are k exact same trajectories that meets the anonymization requirements.
Definition 5. Let (V , E) represent a road-network where V is a set of nodes or intersections
and E represents the edges or roads. A road division, RD is a part of the road-network and
can be represented as (Vrd, Erd) where Vrd represents the vertices and Erd represents the
edges in road division RD. A road division also has a unique identification number, ID.
The MapReduce programming model is adopted for publication of big location
data with privacy preservation. This model efficiently parallelizes the computations for
such publication. A computation is divided into a map and reduce function. Each mapper
gets a chunk of input object trajectories. It maps each trajectory to a suitable reducer. Each
reducer gets its share of the object trajectories, decided by the mappers for clustering and
anonymization. For a given trajectory in a reducer, a suitable cluster is found among the
clusters in the reducer. The reducers do not share the cluster information. Therefore it is
paramount for the mapper to group similar trajectories to the same reducer. Otherwise many
roads will end up getting trimmed as infrequent in each reducer, increasing anonymization
error.
The road map is divided into road divisions, defined in Definition 5 such that
trajectories in one road division are similar as explained in Subsection 4.1.1. Mappers
share the road divisions data. A mapper maps a trajectory to the road division it closely
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matches. Trajectories in one road division goes to the same reducer. Therefore two
similar trajectories in different mappers gets mapped to the same reducer. This reduces
the probability of a trajectory being removed as infrequent in each reducer though it may
be frequent. This further assists in efficient clustering for the anonymization algorithm.
The MapReduce architecture in this approach is illustrated in Figure 4.1. There
are eight input trajectories T1, T2..., T8. Each mapper has the road divisions data






























Figure 4.1. MapReduce Architecture
It maps each trajectory in its input data, a portion of the total input data to a <
key, value > pair. In the < key, value > pair, key is the suitable road division and value
is the trajectory. In the shuffle and sort phase, all the < key, value > pairs belonging
to a reducer gets grouped together and sent to the corresponding reducers. The reducer
performs anonymization on its input trajectories. The road network division algorithm, the
map phase and the reduce phase are further explained in the following subsections.
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4.1.1. Road-Network Division Using Hot Spots, Depth-First Traversal. In
this subsection, the approach for road network division is described. It uses hot spots and
depth-first traversal of the road network. Hot spots,HS, the frequent nodes or intersections
given a sample trajectory data are extracted. The frequency of the nodes is counted in the
sample trajectory data and sorted in descending order. The top |HS| >> RNO nodes
comprises the hot spots where RNO is total number of reducers. The trajectories tend to
populate around hot spots. Therefore the idea is to expand the hot spots using the road
network in depth first manner to form a road division. The expansion around hot spots and
depth first traversal ensure that popular routes are covered in road division formation. It
also divides the trajectories fairly among road divisions.
The road division formation is further explained. The hot spot, hsmax with
maximum frequency is used as the starting node and a depth first traversal of the road
network is performed. The following approaches are used as a stopping criteria of the
traversal.
• The depth of each traversal path from the hot spot exceeds the average number of
nodes per the sample trajectory data.
• The total distance of each traversal from the hot spot exceeds the average road
distance per the sample trajectory data.
When each traversal path from the hot spot satisfies the stopping criteria, a road
division is formed. The road division is represented as a network of all the traversed nodes
in the region. Then the next unvisited hot spot is used as the new starting node for road
division formation. This process is repeated until the total number of road divisions formed
will be equal to the number of reducers.
The depth first traversal using hot spots outputs a total NOrd number of road
divisions. However there may be unvisited nodes which are not yet included in any of the
formed road divisions. For such unvisited nodes, its neighboring nodes are checked. The
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neighboring node with the smallest depth from the hot spot of the road division is found.
The unvisited node is placed in the road division of this neighboring node as described in
Figure 4.2. This process is continued until there remain no unvisited nodes. Figure 4.3
outlines the detail procedure for road-network division.
4.1.2. Map Phase. Each mapper has the road divisions data. The mapper
decides on the road division for mapping each incoming trajectory. The mapper computes
score for each road division based on the number of nodes of the trajectory that the road
division contains. The mapper then finds the road division with the highest score, RDhscore.
If the highest score exceeds 80% of the total nodes in the trajectory, the mapper outputs a
< key, value > pair as < id of RDhscore, trajectory >. If not, the mapper outputs
< residue, trajectory >, residue is the reducer reserved for trajectories which do not fit
in any of the road divisions. Another approach used to find the best matched road division
is to divide the trajectory into partial trajectories. All the points in one partial trajectory
FindAreaForUnvisitedNodes(V , Regions)
Input: List of Road Divisions, Regions; road-network (V , E)
1. loop← true
2. while loop = true do
3. loop← false
4. for each node in V do
5. if node.areaData is empty
6. for each nodeneigh in node.Nbrs do
7. if nodeneigh.areaData is not empty
8. for each key in nodeneigh.areaData do
9. if key in node.areaData
10. update depth of node.areaData.get(key).area with the smaller depth
11. else add nodeneigh.areaData.get(key) to node.areaData.get(key)
12. if node.areaData is not empty
13. find area with the smallest depth in node.areaData, area
14. add node to area
15. else loop← true
Figure 4.2. Algorithm for Finding Area of Unvisited Nodes
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RoadMapDivision(HS, (V , E), RNO )
Input: List of hot spots, HS; road-network (V , E); number of reducers, RNO
Output: List of road map divisions, Regions
1. indexHS ← 0
2. totalArea← RNO
2. startF lag ← true
3. while startF lag = true do
4. node← HS[indexHS]
5. if node.areaData is not empty
6. define list of nodes DS
7. define region r
8. add node to region r
9. add node to DS at index 0
10. node.depth← 1
11. add r, node.depth to node.areaData with key r.id
12. while DS is not empty do
13. firstnode← DS[0]
14. remove element of DS at index 0
15. for each nodeneigh in firstnode.Nbrs
16. if nodeneigh.areaData does not have key r.id
17. if nodeneigh does not voilate the stopping criteria
18. nodeneigh.depth← firstnode.depth + 1
19. add nodeneigh to region r
20. add r, nodeneigh.depth to nodeneigh.areaData with key r.id
21. add nodeneigh to DS at index 0
22. add r to Regions
23. else totalArea← totalArea + 1
24. if indexHS >= HS.size() || indexHS >= totalArea do
25. startF lag ← false
26. FindAreaForUnvisitedNodes(V , Regions)
27. return Regions
Figure 4.3. Road Map Division Using Depth-first Traversal
belong to a single road division and the partial trajectories are the longest that can be
mapped in that road division. The map phase is outlined in detail in Figure 4.4.
4.1.3. Reduce Phase. Figure 4.5 explains the reduce phase in detail. All
the trajectories mapped to the same map division are processed in the same reducer.
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Map (key, value)
Input: Object trajectory, Trajmap, List of road divisions, Regions
Output: (key, value)
1. NODE ← Trajmap.path
2. for each node in NODE do
3. for each region in Regions do
4. if node is in region then
5. score(region) ← score(region) + 1
6. find the region with highest score, regionhigh
7. if score(regionhigh)> 0.8% of total nodes in Trajmap then
8. return (regionhigh.id, Trajmap)
9. else return (residue, Trajmap)
Figure 4.4. Map (key, value)
Reduce (key, value)
Input: Object trajectory list, Trajred; ID of road division,regionid; k
Output: (key, value)
1. AnonymizedTrajred = Clustering-based Anonymization(Trajred, k)
2. return (regionid, AnonymizedTrajred)
Figure 4.5. Reduce (key, value)
The anonymization algorithm is performed on the trajectories in each reducer and
k-anonymized trajectories are obtained as described in Figure 3.3. Here, the anonymization
algorithm is the same as that presented in Section 3.
4.2. EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
In this section, the experimental settings are presented. A comparative study of the
MapReduce-based trajectory anonymization and the centralized approach is also reported.
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4.2.1. Experimental Settings. Two MapReduce-based anonymization ap-
proaches were implemented using different stopping criteria: (1) an approach with
average number of nodes per trajectory as the stopping criteria (MRAN) and (2) an
approach with average road distance per trajectory (MRARD) as the stopping criteria.
The MapReduce-based anonymization approaches are compared with the centralized
ICBA algorithm in terms of the following two error metrics:
Precision =
Pairs of Matching Traj




Pairs Matching Traj +Missing Traj
(4.2)
In the above two equations, the matching trajectories are computed by comparing
the anonymized trajectories obtained from the MapReduce approach and that from the
centralized approach. Specifically, for each anonymized trajectory obtained by the
MapReduce approach, the most similar trajectory in the centralized approach is obtained,
i.e., the trajectory with the largest number of common nodes. If the identified pair of
similar trajectories share more than w% of common nodes, these two trajectories are
considered as a pair of matching trajectories. Then, each pair of identified matching
trajectories will be removed from their datasets when searching for the next pair of
matching trajectories. In the following experiments, w is set to 80. In Equation 4.2,
the “Missing Trj” refers to the number of anonymized trajectories in the centralized
approach that cannot find a matching trajectory in the results of the MapReduce. In a
summary, both precision and recall has a value ranging from 0 and 1. The precision
metric measures the amount of the false positives in the MapReduce approach while the
recall metric measures the amount of the false negatives in the MapReduce approach.
The higher the precision and the recall, the better the accuracy of the MapReduce
approach.
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The implementation was performed in Amazon Elastic MapReduce (Amazon
EMR) using Hadoop, an open source framework, across a cluster of 5 Amazon EC2
m3.2xlarge instances. Each m3.2xlarge instance is configured to have High Frequency
Intel Xeon E5-2670 processor and 30GB of memory.
The used test dataset consisted of 5000 real trajectories; 900 square kilometers
area; 2350 roads; and average 17 nodes per trajectory. A synthetic dataset of size i.e.,
number of trajectories (50k, 100k, 1000k, 100000k) was generated using the same real
road map as that of real dataset. The datasets and their equivalent file size in bytes are
as in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1. Experimental Settings






4.2.2. Experimental Results. The accuracy of MapReduce-based algorithms,
MRAN and MRARD are compared in Figure 4.6 for data size 5k. It can be observed that
they have almost the same precision. However MRAN has higher recall than MRARD.
This can be attributed to using average nodes as the stopping criteria allows greater
expansion than average road distance. Therefore average nodes per trajectory is used as
the stopping criteria for comparing accuracy and processing time for bigger data size.
In Figure 4.7, the accuracy and processing time of the MapReduce-based approach are
reported as the data size vary from 5k to 100k. The accuracy is reported in terms of both
















Figure 4.6. MapReduce-Based Approaches
the anonymization with less error as both the precision and recall are high irrespective
of the data sizes. This can be attributed to the road network division algorithm which
efficiently groups similar trajectories. The MapReduce-based anonymization algorithm
was also tested for bigger datasets, 1000k and 100000k. The centralized approach
failed at 1000k given the available resources. The processing times of the centralized
and MapReduce-based distributed anonymization algorithm are also compared. It is
observed that the change in processing times between the two approaches increases
with increase in data size. The MapReduce-based approach is more efficient when











































Figure 4.7. Effect of Varying Data Size
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the anonymization algorithm. The results show that using MapReduce model is very
promising in anonymizing huge amounts of trajectory data.
4.3. SUMMARY
By using Map Reduce to efficiently parallelize the computations needed to
simplify data, the amount of data that can be processed was increased greatly. The
increase was enough to confidently claim that the method could handle the exabytes
of data being produced per month globally and scale to handle even more data in the
future. Additionally, the trajectory data was efficiently anonymized and protected from
direct knowledge or inference attacks.
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5. TRUSTWORTHINESS EVALUATION DURING LOCATION-BASED
SERVICES
This section presents the approach on evaluating the trustworthiness of
messages disseminated during location-based services. The Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks
(VANETs) are used as the background platform to elaborate the approach.
5.1. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
An overview of the proposed Real-time Message Content Validation (RMCV)
scheme is given first. Each step of the scheme is then elaborated including the associated
trust model.
The core of the RMCV is an information-oriented trust model which estimates the
trustworthiness of message content by taking into account a variety of VANET-specific
dimensions, such as who handled the message at what location and what time. The
RMCV scheme consists of two main components: (i) Message Classification; and (ii)
Information-oriented Trust Model. The outcome of the scheme is a “trustworthiness”
value associated to each received message.
The model applies to information inquiry or information sharing applications, for
which the following format of messages was adopted:
Definition 1. Let Msg(locq, locint, etype, info, te, mpath) be a message transmitted in
VANETs for information inquiry or sharing:
• locq: The location of the query issuer or the entity to receive the shared information.
• locint: The querying location that the query issuer would like to know about the
information, or the location of the shared information.
• etype: The event type which could be “traffic condition”, “road condition”,
“coupon”, etc.
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• info: The information about the location locint, which could be the query results or
shared information.
• te: The time the query results or the shared information is available.
• mpath: This records the message propagation path. It is in the form of [(locs1 ,
ts1),(locs2 , ts2), ...), which means a vehicle at locs1 generated the message Msg at
ts1 and then the message was forwarded by the vehicle at locs2 at ts2 , and so on.
The locations of senders and message sending time are assumed to be stamped by a
tamper-proof device installed in the vehicle.
Figure 5.1(a) illustrates an example scenario of information inquiry. Vehicle V1
at location loc1 initiates a query on traffic condition at location loca. The query message
is in the form of Msg1(loc1, loca, “traffic”, NULL, NULL, [(loc1, t1)]), where two fields
info and te are waiting to be answered. The query was propagated to vehicles (V2, V3,
V4) close to the querying location loca. V2 and V3 honestly reported that there was a
traffic jam by sending back the messages Msg2 and Msg3 respectively:
Msg2(loc1, loca, “traffic”, “traffic jam”, t2, [(loc2, t2)])
Msg3(loc1, loca, “traffic”, “traffic jam”, t3, [(loc3, t3)])
(a) Information Query (b) Information Sharing
Figure 5.1. Example Scenarios
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However, a malicious node V4 who lied that the traffic was fine and sent the
following message: Msg4(loc1, loca, “traffic”, “traffic fine”, t4, [(loc4, t4)]). Further, in
order to make the message appear trustworthy, V4 forwarded the message to multiple
vehicles (V7 and V8) instead of the one close to V1. A malicious vehicle may not know
how many other malicious vehicles out there. Thus vehicle V4 has to spread his messages
to more vehicles otherwise his false messages can be easily ruled out based on a simple
majority vote by V1.
Upon receiving the messages initially sent by V2, V3 and V4, the querying vehicle
V1 needs to analyze the conflicting information carried by the messages. It needs to
figure out which one to trust. The proposed RMCV scheme can be executed by V1 to
conduct the trust evaluation, and it is expected that the true messages provided by V2 and
V3 will receive higher trust scores.
The RMCV scheme also works for scenarios wherein one would like to share
information with others. As shown in Figure 5.1(b), the owner of vehicle V2 would like
to share a coupon from a restaurant that he/she just visited. Thus, V2 broadcasts the
coupon code to other vehicles using message Msg5, where locq is set to NULL as this is
a broadcasting message: Msg5(NULL, loca, “coupon”, “15% off code of TJ Restaurant
15OFF”, t5, [(loc2, t5)]).
During the message propagation, some malicious nodes may purposely modify
the coupon code to be invalid such as given by Msg13. However, the malicious node
would not be able to fake location and time information (i.e., mpath) which is directly
generated by vehicle’s tamper proof device by using techniques such as [57]. For a
vehicle which receives multiple coupon messages, it will again utilize the RMCV scheme
to help identify the more trustworthy version: Msg11(NULL, loca, “coupon”, “15% off
code of TJ Restaurant 15OFF”, t6, [(loc2, t5),(loc5, t6]).
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5.2. MESSAGE CLASSIFICATION
In VANETs, one vehicle may receive multiple messages with different and
possibly contrasting information from different vehicles during a short period of time.
These messages may be related to different events (or different queries) occurring at
same or different places. Therefore, the first step is to identify the messages describing
the same event from the potentially large amount of received messages so that the
analysis can be conducted separately for each event.
One may think of using clustering algorithms to cluster these messages. Messages
corresponding to the same event may be similar or conflicting, if spurious or inaccurate
messages are included. Direct adoption of conventional clustering algorithms is likely
to put these related but conflicting messages in different groups, and hence affect
the construction of the trust model. For example, applying a conventional K-means
clustering algorithm to messages received by the vehicle V1 illustrated in Figure 5.1,
three clusters may be obtained: cluster C1 (containing messages of “traffic jam”), cluster
C2 of messages about “traffic fine”, and cluster C3 for the coupon code. Such clustering
did not provide any hint that information in C1 and C2 is in fact responding to the same
query and they are conflicting. Moreover, the cluster of C3 did not identify the false
coupon code either since the messages are very much similar in terms of content and
other values of other components (e.g., location, event type) in the messages.
Thus, in order to better classify messages disseminated in VANETs, a two-level
clustering algorithm is proposed. The first level clustering groups messages describing
the same event regardless the message content. To achieve this, messages are clustered
based on their similarity on the three components: locint, te, and etype. Specifically, two
messages (Msgi and Msgj) would be placed in the same cluster if they satisfy all the
following conditions:
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• Dl(locinti , locintj ) ≤ ρd: Dl is the Euclidean distance of two locations. This
condition requires that the two messages are reporting events not further than
distance ρd so that it can be inferred that the two messages are likely to be about
the same event. In this work, ρd is selected to be the width of a road which is
about 20 meters for a three-lane road.
• |tei − tej | ≤ ρt: Messages sent from the same locations may not refer to the same
event. For example, messages responding to different queries may be sent from the
same location at different timestamps. Therefore, the time threshold ρt is used to
constraint the consideration within messages sent during nearby timestamps. In the
experiments, ρt is set to be 30s within which most query results would not have
big changes. For example, traffic condition would not change a lot within 30s.
• etypei = etypej : Two messages about the same event obviously need to have the
same event type.
For each cluster obtained from the first level clustering, the second level
clustering is conducted. The second level clustering aims to identify conflicting
information regarding the same event. This clustering is conducted mainly by examining
the message content, i.e., the similarity between the value of component (info) in the
message. To compute the similarity of message content, first the keywords are extracted
from info of a message by excluding articles (“a”, “an”, “the”) and connection words
that do not carry important information. For example, given a message “there is no
traffic jam”, it is converted to a set of keywords {“no”, “traffic”, “jam”}. Then, the
keywords in the set are sorted in the alphabetical order. After that, the edit distance [65]
and WordNet [70] are applied to compute the distance between keywords belonging to
two messages. The distance calculation of two keyword sets KW1 and KW2 consists of
three steps:
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1. Firstly, the pairs of keywords that fully match each other are identified and
removed from further consideration.
2. Next considered are the remaining keywords in the two sets that are pairs of
synonyms based on WordNet. All such pairs are removed.
3. For remaining keywords, the keywords in KW1 and KW2 which have small edit
distance are paired. These edit distances are summed up to obtain the edit distance
(denoted as Ded).
4. If there is any keyword left unpaired, such as when the two keyword sets have
different number of keywords, the total characters of the unpaired keywords are
summed up and added to Ded.
If the distance (Ded) between two message content is smaller than ρinfo, the two
messages will be put in the same cluster. To ensure that conflicting information would
have a high probability to be placed in different clusters, a strict threshold ρinfo is
adopted which is set to 2 (the length of an important keyword “no”). For example,
suppose that KW1={“no”, “traffic”, “jam”} and KW2={“traffic”, “congestion”}. After
sorting the keywords in each set, step 1 removes the matching keyword “traffic”. Step 2
removes the synonyms “jam” and “congestion”. Step 3 is skipped since there is no more
pair left. Step 4 returns the final distance Ded = 2 which is the length of the remaining
keyword “no”. It is worth noting that due to variety of the ways to express the same
information, the distance here is just an estimation and may not be always accurate in
some cases when messages have same meaning but are expressed in very different ways.
The discussion on advanced natural language processing is out of the scope of this work.
To obtain a better understanding of the whole process of the message
classification, the example scenarios are studied given in Figure 5.1. Vehicle V1 received
7 messages which are Msg7, Msg8, ..., Msg13. Suppose that te in all the messages
are fairly close to one another, i.e., the difference less than ρt. Applying the three
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conditions on locint, te and etype, the following two clusters are obtained after the
first-level clustering:
C1 = {Msg7,Msg8,Msg9,Msg10}, C2 = {Msg11,Msg12,Msg13}.
This is because messages in C1 report the same type of event “traffic” at the same
location loca almost at same time, while messages in C2 are about coupon information
at loca.
Next, second-level clustering is conducted for C1 and C2 respectively. The cluster
C1 is further divided into two clusters based on the message content:
C11 = {Msg7,Msg8}, C12 = {Msg9,Msg10}.
Similarly, the cluster C2 is also divided into two clusters based on the content:
C21 = {Msg11,Msg12}, C22 = {Msg13}.
5.3. INFORMATION-ORIENTED TRUST MODEL
After the message classification, the next task is to determine which group
of messages are truth-telling. To achieve this, an information-oriented trust model is
designed. The overall process is to identify the factors that may be indicative of message
trustworthiness, and then quantify their impact and integrate their effects to generate
an overall trustworthiness score that can be easily understood by end users for making
decisions. Three important factors are identified that affect message trustworthiness,
which are content similarity, content conflict and routing path similarity. In what follows,
an explanation of why they are important, how they affect the trust score is provided.
The trust model is finally derived based on these factors.
5.3.1. Effect of Content Similarity. Given a group of messages associated to
a same event, similar messages are generally considered to be supportive to one another.
Moreover, similar to daily life conversations, the more people supporting the same fact,
the more likely the fact would have some true ground. Though this observation may
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not always hold as discussed later in Section 5.3.2., it is certainly an important factor
to be considered when judging the trustworthiness of a message. To model these two
effects, two parameters are used. The first parameter is the maximum distance (maxDc)
of content between two messages in the same cluster. It quantifies the similarity of
information in the same cluster. The smaller the distance, the higher support level of
the information given by each other. The second parameter is the number of messages
(Nc) in the cluster which models the second effect: the more messages in the cluster, the
higher support the message received. The two parameters are then integrated to compute













The rationale behind Equation 5.1 is explained as follows.
• In the first part of the formula, Ne is the total number of messages regarding the
event. Dividing Nc by Ne is for the purpose of obtaining a normalized value
ranging in 0 and 1, since 0 ≤ Nc ≤ Ne. Such normalization helps make values
obtained from different clusters of messages comparable. The effect of Nc is then
modeled by an exponential function e
Nc
Ne . The reason to choose the exponential
function is that the resulting value grows faster when the effect becomes more
dominant. This maps the following scenario. For groups of few number of
messages (e.g., two or three messages), it is hard to say one group is more
trustworthy than the other just because of it has one more supportive message.
Therefore, such groups will have very close trust scores. When the number of
messages in a group is much bigger, the trust score will grow much faster using
the exponential function, and this represents that the probability of the message




, maxDc is normalized to the range of 0 to 1 by using the possible
maximum distance ρed. Recall that ρed is the threshold used to determine whether
two messages can be placed in the same cluster. The value 3
2
is used for two
purposes. First, it reverses the effect of maxDc
ρed
so that when the difference of
messages is greater, the trust score would be lower. Second, it ensures that the
second part will have certain effect on the overall trust score even if it reaches the
maximum distance. In particular, when messages in the cluster are the same, i.e.,
maxDc = 0, the second part returns a value 1.5. In contrast, when maxDc = 1,
the second part returns value 0.5.





e. By dividing the product by 3
2
e, the final similarity score is normalized to
be less than 1. It is always greater than 0 since messages in the same cluster are
expected to have at least some similarity.
5.3.2. Effect of Routing Path Similarity. It is likely for one to trust a message
which has a large number of other similar messages as the support. However, considering
content similarity may not be sufficient to determine the trustworthiness of the message
since in some cases a large number of messages may also cause illusion. An extreme
case is that if all messages have the same origin and the origin is a malicious vehicle,
these messages should not be trusted. From the example shown in Figure 5.1, the vehicle
V1 received two groups of conflicting messages about the traffic condition. These two
groups of messages have equal content similarity scores according to Equation 5.1 in
Section 5.5., making it difficult to tell which is more trustworthy. However, if observed
closely, one may notice that the group of false messages (Msg9 and Msg10 are actually
provided by the same source vehicle, while the group of true messages (Msg7 and
Msg8) have different source providers. Following a general assumption that majority of
people are honest, it is less likely that the majority of people purposely provide wrong
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information. Therefore, the probability of multiple source providers reporting the same
wrong information is expected to be lower than that of a single source provider in most
cases. More generally speaking, if similar messages share more common nodes during
their routing paths, the risk of messages being tampered increases.
Based on the above discussion, the effect of routing path similarity is modeled by
using three parameters: the number of messages (Nc) in the cluster, the number of the
origins of the messages (Nsrc), and the number of distinct vehicles (Ndif ) in the routing
paths of messages in the same cluster. Then, the path similarity function is designed
based on the following guidelines:
• If there are a large number of source providers (Nsrc), the message routing paths
are less likely to be similar.
• If there are common vehicles in multiple paths and the common vehicle is
malicious, all messages forwarded by the malicious vehicle may be tampered.
To model this, the more distinct vehicles (Ndif ) involved in the same cluster of
messages, the lower path similarity should be.










In Equation 5.2, Nall denotes the total number of vehicle nodes involved in forwarding
the messages in the cluster C. If the same vehicle occurs in different paths, each of its
occurrence would be counted to Nall. Then, NdifNall yields the percentage of the distinct
vehicles in the routing paths. Though this percentage also reflects the difference of
source providers to certain degree, an equal weight (0.5) is still assigned to the number
of source providers due to its importance.
The steps of computing the path similarity are illustrated using the example in
Figure 5.1 . In cluster C11 = {Msg7,Msg8}, the routing paths are the following:
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Msg7 : V2 – V5; Msg8 : V3 – V6.
Observe that in the above two (Nc = 2) messages, there are two different sources
(Nsrc = 2), four different nodes (Ndif = 4), and total four nodes (Nall = 4). Therefore,
the Pathc = 1− (0.5 · 22 + 0.5 ·
4
4
)=0, which means the paths are totally different.
In cluster C12 = {Msg9,Msg10}, the routing paths are the following:
Msg9:V4 – V7; Msg10 : V4 – V8.
Accordingly, Nc = 2, Nsrc = 1, Ndif = 3, Nall = 4 are obtained. Then, the
numbers are plugged into Equation 5.2 and path similarity is obtained as Pathc = 1 −
(0.5 · 1
2
+ 0.5 · 3
4
) = 0.375 which has a higher path similarity score compared to cluster
C11.
The path similarity serves as a penalty value to the support value of a cluster of
messages. The more similar the routing paths of messages in the same cluster, the less
support to each other will be considered. In other words, the more independent of routing
paths, the less probability of messages being tampered. The Equation 5.1 is revised as
follows:
Support′(c) = (1− Pathc) · Support(c) (5.3)
5.3.3. Effect of Content Conflict. The analysis of messages referring to a
same event, may result in more than one cluster of messages. Messages in different
clusters indicate the inconsistency of the information of the event. As shown in the
example of Figure 5.1, one cluster of messages claim there is traffic jam while the other
claim the traffic is fine. It is obvious that content conflict has a negative impact on
the trustworthiness of messages, and the more conflicting messages the heavier impact.
Specifically, let C1, ..., Ck be the clusters of messages regarding the same event. For














A higher conflicting value will be obtained if there are more messages against current
cluster Ci. The conflicting value is 0 if there is not any conflicting clusters. Here, the
exponential function is adopted for the same purpose of amplifying the effect.
5.3.4. Final Trust Score. To obtain the final trust score trust(c), the
conflicting value is integrated to the support score Support’(c). In particular, the






It is modeled based on the following rationale. When the conflicting value is small,
its effect should not be very dominant. In this way, if there exist few false messages,
these false messages would not affect the overall trustworthiness of the true messages.
When the conflicting value is big, its effect grows faster as it is more likely that the
information in the cluster being affected is not true regarding the existence of a large
number of opponents. Therefore, as can be seen from Equation 5.5, eξ·Conc models the
impact of the conflicting value whereby the exponential function along with a parameter
ξ make the resulting value grow faster with the increase of Conc. Here, ξ is a positive
value that helps adjust the importance of the conflicting value, and it is set to e in the
experiments. Finally, the score is normalized to range 0 to 1 by multiplying 1
eξ−1
. The
higher the trust score, the more trustworthy the message may be.
Finally, the overall process of estimating the trustworthiness of a message is
summarized. Given a bunch of messages received by vehicle V within a short time
interval ρt, the RMCV scheme first clusters messages according to the events, and then
further clusters messages based on their content. After that, trust scores are computed
for all the clusters of messages. For clusters of the same event, the one which received
the highest trust score is selected. If its trust score is above an experience threshold
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(e.g., 0.5), the system would report that the content of this cluster may be trustworthy.
Otherwise, the system would report that none of the received messages are trustworthy.
In addition, one more interesting scenario is introduced that can also be handled
by this approach. Suppose that a vehicle Vx sends the following two messages:
• Msgx1: At time t1, there is a traffic jam between exits 25 and 30 in HWY 65.
• Msgx2: At time t2, there is no traffic jam between exits 25 and 30 in HWY 65.
It may be the case that between t1 and t2 things have changed, or it could be the case
that a vehicle can only observe some partial view and later on may see a complete view
and send a different message for correction.
For the given scenario, the RCMV scheme will deal with it as follows:
• Case 1: Suppose that t2 is far from t1 (e.g., 30 minutes later). All messages
(including the one from vehicle Vx and others) about traffic jam sent around time
t1 would be considered as message for one event. These messages are compared to
see if there was a real traffic jam at t1. Messages sent around t2 will be considered
as another event (no jam) which could be true if the traffic was clear at t2.
• Case 2: Suppose that t2 is close to t1 (e.g., only a couple of minutes different), and
there is in fact no traffic jam but vehicle Vx made a wrong observation at t1. In
this case, the message of “traffic jam” will be considered as a conflicting message.
Assuming that majority is honest, more messages of “no traffic jam” is expected
around timestamp t1, so that the receiver would not be confused.
5.4. EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
In this section, the experimental settings are presented and a comparative study
of the approach against the existing work is also reported.
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The implementation is written in JAVA and conducted in a desktop of 64-bit
Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5630 2.53GHz machine. The message disseminated in VANETs is
simulated as follows. A parameter is adopted that controls the number of hops Nhop
between the source provider and the query issuer (or the last message receiver) being
considered. In the experiments, Nhop is varied from 1 to 5. At each hop, 100 vehicles are
generated. For each event, on a randomly selected hop, δ percent of malicious vehicles
is selected. For the vehicles at the first hop, true messages are generated about several
events for honest vehicles, and conflicting messages for malicious vehicles. Honest
vehicles will honestly forward whatever messages they receive to one vehicle at the next
hop, while malicious vehicles will modify the received messages and forward them to
multiple vehicles (ranging from 1 to Nf ) at the next hop.
The approach is compared with the work by Raya et al. [56] which is the latest
representative work on data-centric trust establishment in VANETs. As their work is
based on Bayesian Inference, it is denoted as BI in the experiment figures. Since the
BI work only considers a single event, the messages are limited to one event when
comparing to them. Also, the BI work assumes the existence of trust scores (probability
of trustworthiness) of each message for computing the final trust score of the event. In
the simulation in their work, they assume the probability of trustworthiness of individual
messages follows a Beta distribution with the mean equals to 0.6 and 0.8. The same
parameters as in their work are adopted in the experiments.
5.4.1. Experimental Results. In the first two rounds of experiments, the
properties of the RMCV are examined. In the last round of experiments, the RMCV
approach is compared with the BI work in terms of the ability of preventing attack.
5.4.1.1 Efficiency. In the first round of experiments, the objective is to
evaluate the efficiency of the RMCV scheme. Unlike the BI work which assumes
the existence of scores of individual messages and just computes one equation for the
final trust score, the RMCV scheme offers detailed steps to obtain the trust scores
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of individual messages. These steps include message classification and routing path
similarity analysis. The Figure 5.2(a) reports the total time taken by the RMCV scheme
from messages being received till the trust score being computed. The total number of
messages that a vehicle received during ρt are varied from 100 to 1000. There are five
hops along each routing path. It is not surprising to see that the processing time increases
with the number of messages to be handled. This is because the more messages, the
more time needed for message classification and path analysis. It is also observed that
the time for processing 1000 messages is really short (less than 50ms), which indicates
that the scheme is feasible and efficient to meet the strict time constraint in real-time
applications.
5.4.1.2 Effect of conflicting value and path similarity on trustworthiness
score. In this experiment, it is presented how conflicting values and path similarity
values affect the overall trustworthiness score. From Figure 5.2(b), it can be observed
that the trustworthiness score decreases with the increase of conflicting values or path
similarity values. More importantly, the trust score drops faster when the conflicting
value and path similarity value become larger. Thus, the model is tolerant to cases when
there are few false reports (i.e., conflicting information), and becomes more sensitive
when the number of false reports increases.
(a) Processing Time (b) Trustworthiness Score
Figure 5.2. The RMCV Approach
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5.4.1.3 Impact of false messages on vehicles accepting true messages. The
RCMV scheme is now compared with the BI work. The effect of increase in the
percentage of false messages per vehicle to the percentage of good vehicles accepting
true messages is examined. A simulation of 1000 rounds was run for a group of 100
vehicles. The results are reported in Figure 5.3. From the figure, it can be observed
that when the amount of false messages is less than 50%, both the BI work and the
RCMV approach can very well identify false reports, yielding close to 100% acceptance
rate of true messages. However, once there are more than 50% false messages, the BI
work results in very low (close to 0%) acceptance rate of true messages. In fact, the
BI work almost downgrades to a majority vote. In contrast, the RCMV approach yields
much better performance even if there are many false messages. This is attributed to
the way the conflicting information and path similarity are modeled. Specifically, since
false messages tend to have higher path similarity scores, the penalty score from path
similarity decreases the impact of the large amount of false messages on making the
final decision.
Figure 5.3. RCMV vs. BI
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5.5. SUMMARY
This section presents a novel information-oriented scheme for evaluating
trustworthiness of messages disseminated in VANETs, which incorporates content
similarity, content conflict and route similarity into the trust model to best suit the
dynamics of VANET environment.
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6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this dissertation, three works are presented with respect to privacy management
and trustworthiness evaluation in location-based services. Specifically, the first work
addresses the problem on publishing location data with privacy preservation while
maintaining high data utility rate. The second work extends the centralized location
data publishing approach to a distributed version by leveraging MapReduce technology,
and is capable of processing a huge amount of location data in an efficient manner.
Finally, the third work addresses an important issue correlated to privacy preservation,
which is the trustworthiness evaluation of messages disseminated by anonymous users
in location-based service. For all the proposed approaches, extensive experiments have
been conducted using both synthetic and real datasets to verify the ideas.
Regarding future research directions, the following are envisioned. First,
fine-grained temporal parameters may be integrated into the trajectory anoymization
algorithm to generate more insight of the traffic flow. Second, a few other options
of map partitioning may be explored to further reduce the information loss caused by
the distributed processing in MapReduce. Third, existing natural language processing
techniques may be integrated to the content evaluation in our proposed trust model to
improve usability of the system.
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